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In Quest of Reason:
The Licensing Decisions of the
Federal Banking Agencies*
Kenneth E. Scottt
In terms of both size and economic importance, the banking
business plays a pre-eminent role in the United States. At the end
of 1973, commercial banks, mutual savings banks and savings and
loan associations held over a trillion dollars in total assets. There
were almost 20,000 separate institutions, of which 6,699 were fed-
erally chartered; an additional 11,750 state chartered institutions
had federal deposit insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)' or Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration (FSLIC).2
Along with the federal involvement and support goes an exten-
sive structure of federal regulation. National banks are chartered
and supervised by the Comptroller of the Currency, and automat-
ically receive deposit insurance from the FDIC. State banks are
chartered and supervised by the different state banking author-
ities; in addition, they may join the Federal Reserve System (and
thus automatically receive FDIC insurance) or the FDIC itself,
thereby incurring a secondary level of regulation and supervision.
* This article is based on a study undertaken for the Administrative Conference of the
United States. The views expressed, however, are solely those of the author and do not
represent an official position of the Administrative Conference. The author wishes to
thank the Comptroller of the Currency and his staff for their full and gracious coopera-
tion in making charter and branch decision files available for this study.
t Professor of Law, Stanford University.
1. Originall% created by Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168.
2. Originally created by Act of June 27, 1934, ch. 847, tit. IV, § 402, 48 Stat. 1256.
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Federal savings and loan associations are chartered and regulated
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (hereafter FHLBB or
Bank Board) and are automatically insured by the FSLIC. State
savings and loans may also join the FSLIC to obtain insurance of
accounts. Tables 1 and 2 provide a statistical picture of the juris-
diction of the various federal banking agencies.
Since its institution in the early 1930s, federal deposit insurance
has gained widespread popularity and acceptance and is now re-
garded as a virtual necessity for any new bank or savings and loan;
over ninety-seven percent of banking assets are held by insured
institutions. Whether directly through control over chartering or
indirectly through control over insurance of deposits, therefore,
the federal banking agencies determine entry into the banking
business. Moreover, through their approval powers over branches
for existing banks and savings and loans, the federal banking
agencies can to a large degree control entry into new markets and
further influence the structure of banking competition.
These are not unimportant powers, but they have not been the
focus of much public attention. This study inquires into the way
these powers have been and now are exercised, and it suggests
changes in regulatory procedures. The influence that the courts
have exerted over these procedures will also be examined with
some care.
We will begin with the area of primary supervision and direct
licensing controls: approvals by the Comptroller of the Currency
of charters and branches of national banks, and by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board of charters and branches for federal
savings and loan associations. In the case of the Comptroller, it
will be necessary to analyze a rather long and complicated se-
quence of cases in some detail-partly to convey a picture of past
difficulties, and partly to understand the posture in which the
agency now finds itself vis-a-vis the judiciary. Then we will turn to
the area of secondary supervision: decisions to admit state char-
tered banks to membership in the Federal Reserve System (FRS) or
in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or to approve their
branches; and decisions to admit state savings and loans to mem-
bership in the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.
In both instances we will be concerned with how much discretion
has been vested in the agency in question, and the grounds and
manner of its exercise.
Thereafter we will look at these decisions in more statistical
terms-in aggregate results for all four agencies over the period
of the last five years, and in a sample study of decision files for the
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Comptroller. Based on all these materials, some concluding obser-
vations and recommendations will be offered.
I. PRIMARY APPROVALS
A. The Statutory Foundation
The national banking system and the office of the Comptroller
of the Currency as its administrator were established by the Na-
tional Bank Act of 1864,3 which superseded the National Cur-
rency Act of 1863. 4 The language of those acts of over a century
ago is reflected today in sections 12 through 27 of the United
States Code. "Associations for carrying on the business of bank-
ing" may be formed by five or more natural persons, who must
enter into and sign articles of association, a copy of which is to be
forwarded to the Comptroller. 5 The organizers must also execute
and file with the Comptroller an organization certificate, giving
among other things the bank's name, place of operation, and
amount of capital stock.6 The amount of capital required by law
ranges from $50,000 in localities with a population of no more
than 6000 to $200,000 in cities with a population of over 50,000.7
Upon receiving this information, the Comptroller is to
examine into the condition of such association, ascertain es-
pecially the amount of money paid in on account of its capital,
the name and place of residence of each of its directors, and
the amount of the capital stock of which each is the owner in
good faith, and generally whether such association has com-
plied with all the provisions of this chapter required to en-
title it to engage in the business of banking;...s
If upon that examination "it appears that such association is law-
fully entitled to commence the business of banking, the comptrol-
ler shall give to such association a certificate... that such associa-
tion is authorized to commence such business."9 The Comptroller
is authorized to withhold the certificate only when "he has reason
to suppose that the shareholders have formed the same for any
other than the legitimate objects contemplated by this chapter."'1
3. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
4. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
5. 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
6. Id. §§ 22-23.
7. Id. § 51.
8. Id. § 26.
9. Id. § 27.
10. Id.
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On its face, the statute does not seem to grant the Comptroller
broad discretion to determine whether a community should have a
new bank.'1 This fact bothered the district court in Pitts v. Camp,1
2
and yet that court declared itself "impressed with the long and
continued practice of the Comptroller of considering the need of
the community [and] with the fact that the weight of authority ac-
cepts the consideration by the Comptroller of the need factor with-
out question."'13 The court then cited Sterling National Bank of
Davie v. Camp,14 which had asserted: "It has always been recognized
that this legislation confers vast discretion on the Comptroller to
approve or disapprove a new charter application."'
15
These decisions considerably overstate the matter. It has not
"always been recognized" that the National Bank Act confers vast
chartering discretion upon the Comptroller, and it has not been
his "long and continued practice" to assert such discretion. The
dominant views of the mid-nineteenth century favored "free bank-
ing," as part of the general trend towards "free incorporation"-
the idea that charters to do various kinds of business should be
readily available to anyone who complied with relatively simple
and specific statutory requirements, rather than be grants of spe-
cial privilege by the legislature to those who obtained (or bought)
its favors. New York and Michigan passed free-bank laws in the
1830s, and by the time of the Civil War roughly half the states had
adopted similar measures.' 6 The National Currency Act and the
National Bank Act were designed as free-bank laws, and with that
origin in mind their language becomes perfectly comprehensible.
17
11. The Court has difficulty in seeing language in those sections giving the Comptrol-
ler discretion in granting the certificate if the specific requirements of the act are
met....
The statutory language, which the defendant contends makes the need of the new
bank a proper consideration and commits the determination of that need to the Comp-
troller's discretion, does not impress the court.
Pitts v. Camp, 329 F. Supp. 1302, 1307 (D.S.C. 1971), vacated, 463 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1972),
vacated and remanded, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1307.
14. 431 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971).
15. Id. at 516.
16. R. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION 22-23 (1968). This is an
official history of the Office of the Comptroller.
17. See generally id. at 44-45. See also B. HAMM\NOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN A.MERICA 727
(1957); 2 F. REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING 99-105 (1968). In practice, the
first Comptrollers tried on occasion to make their own judgments felt, but the legal footing
for their efforts was minimal. "The law did not require the organizers to satisfy the Comp-
troller that they were qualified to engage in the banking business, that additional banking
facilities were needed, or that the proposed bank had reasonable prospects of success."
Wyatt, Federal Banking Legislation, in BANKING STUDIES 44 (F.R.B. 1941).
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For a period of a decade following the Civil War, limitations on
the amount of national bank-note circulation served indirectly
to limit chartering of national banks, but when that condition
ended in 1875 national bank charters were available for every
qualifying group.1 8 For the balance of the nineteenth century,
Comptrollers not only recognized but proclaimed their lack of
chartering discretion-for example, Comptroller Knox in 1881:
"[T]he Comptroller has no discretionary power in the matter, but
must necessarily sanction the organization .. of such associations
as shall have conformed in all respects to the legal requirements."' 9
A shift in position did not begin until 1908, when a new Comp-
troller took office on the heels of the Panic of 1907,20 and it did not
become established policy until the 1920s.2 I This new approach
did not acquire a respectable statutory foundation, however, until
the Great Depression led to the creation of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation 22 and enactment of the Banking Act of
1935.3 The latter enactment required the Comptroller, when he
chartered a new national bank, which automatically would become
an insured bank, to certify to the FDIC that he had "considered"
the same six factors that the FDIC was supposed to consider in
passing upon the application for insured status of a state nonmem-
ber bank:24 "The financial history and condition of the bank, the
adequacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects,
the general character of its management, the convenience and
needs of the community to be served by the bank, and whether or
not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes" of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act.'5 In this somewhat backhanded
fashion the law recognized-or, more accurately, created-the
Comptroller's chartering discretion. To the extent that there are
standards governing that discretion, therefore, they are to be
found in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, not the National
Bank Act.
Turning to the subject of branching, we find that it goes without
mention in the National Bank Act of 1864.26 This legislative omis-
sion was regarded by early Comptrollers as prohibiting branch
18. R. ROBERTSON, supra note 16, at 57-61.
19. 1881 COMP. CURR. ANN. REP. 11.
20. R. ROBERTSON, supra note 16, at 66-69.
21. Id. at 95-96.
22. The FDIC was created by Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168.
23. Act of Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 688, amending 12 U.S.C. § 264.
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1814 (1970).
25. Id. § 1816.
26. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
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banking by national banks, 27 a view that was confirmed by the At-
torney General in 191128 and ultimately by the Supreme Court in
1924.29 Meanwhile, branching by state banks had become exten-
sive in a number of states, and considerable pressure built up
for allowing national banks to do likewise. During the 1920s the
Comptroller responded by approving "consolidations" as a device
for obtaining branches and by authorizing "offices" that were al-
most branches. 30
A more satisfactory answer was achieved with the passage of
first the McFadden Act of 1927,'3 which permitted national banks
to have "inside" branches (located in the same city as the head of-
fice), and then the Banking Act of 1933,32 which authorized "out-
side" branches (located elsewhere in the state), in both cases only
to the extent state law expressly authorized such branches for state
banks and subject to certain additional capital requirements. As-
suming the geographical and capital requirements were satisfied,
a national bank could establish, operate or move a branch only
with the "approval" of the Comptroller. 33 No standards were pro-
vided to govern the grant or denial of approval.
The statutory picture for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board is
less complicated. Section 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 4
authorized the FHLBB, "giving primary consideration to the
best practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing insti-
tutions in the United States," to provide for the organization,
chartering, and operation of federal savings and loan associations.
Section 5(e) of the Act went on to provide the following standards:
No charter shall be granted except to persons of good char-
acter and responsibility, nor unless in the judgment of the
Board a necessity exists for such an institution in the commu-
nity to be served, nor unless there is a reasonable probability
of its usefulness and success, nor unless the same can be es-
tablished without undue injury to properly conducted existing
local thrift and home-financing institutions. 35
The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, like the National Bank
Act of 1864, made no reference to the subject of branches. Never-
27. R. ROBERTSON, supra note 16, at 81-85.
28. 29 Op. Ar'y GEN. 81 (1911).
29. First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
30. R. ROBERTSON, supra note 16, at 100-04.
31. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228.
32. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat 189.
33. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c), (e) (1970).
34. Act of June 13, 1933, ch. 64, § 5, 48 Stat. 132.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(e) (1970).
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theless, the Bank Board from the outset took the position that it
had the power to authorize branches, and was upheld when ul-
timately challenged in court.3 6 The statute even today is silent on
branching and obviously contains no standards to affect the
FHLBB's discretion when passing upon branch applications by
federal savings and loans.
So by different routes the two agencies emerge at about the same
point. Both face a short list of general standards in the relevant
statutes for charter approvals, and no standards whatever for
branch approvals. Furthermore, the charter standards are either
too narrow or too unspecified to serve as much of a guide for or
restraint upon the exercise of discretion. Of the Comptroller's
list of six factors, the first ("the financial history and condition of
the bank") is inapplicable to new charters and the last (corporate
powers "consistent with the purposes" of the Act) is a routine for-
mality.37 The second and third ("adequacy of its capital structure"
and "future earnings prospects" for the Comptroller, "reasonable
probability of its usefulness and success" for the Bank Board) do
have content, but depend on a conjectural exercise in financial
prediction. The fourth ("general character of its management" for
the Comptroller, "persons of good. character and responsibility"
for the Bank Board) imposes a minimal constraint, occasionally in
issue but capable of being met by millions of possible applicants
and thousands of possible managing officers. It is therefore the
fifth ("the convenience and needs of the community to be served"
for the Comptroller, "a necessity ... for such an institution in the
community to be served" and establishment "without undue in-
jury to properly conducted existing local thrift and home-financing
institutions" for the Bank Board) that in most cases serves as the
ground for decision. For convenience, this latter criterion will be
referred to simply as the "need" factor.
Standards so judgmental and indefinite constitute in effect a
delegation by the legislature to the administrative agency of the
task of developing public policy in this area. We shall next examine
the manner in which the two agencies have done so.
36. First Nat'l Bank of McKeesport v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Homestead, 225
F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1955); North Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Kearny Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
187 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951). In its branch regulation, the
FHLBB has simply repeated the statutory charter standards. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.14(c)
(1974).
37. A simple prohibition of the exercise of inconsistent powers would suffice. Cl. 12
C.F.R. § 332.1 (1974).
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B. Decision Procedures and Judicial Review: Pre-1965
One way for an agency to develop law and policy is by undertak-
ing comprehensive studies, followed by the issuance of detailed
policy statements or regulations. Neither the Office of the Comp-
troller nor the FHLBB has availed itself of this approach. On oc-
casion, general statements of "philosophy" appear in public
speeches or annual reports, 38 but they have never been carried to
the point of providing enlightenment as to how a particular appli-
cation might fare.
Another way to develop policy is by the common law method of
case-by-case adjudication. In the period since the Comptroller
began regularly exercising approval discretion in the 1920s and
the Bank Board started performing that function for federal sav-
ings and loans in the 1930s, the two agencies have passed upon
thousands of applications for charters and branches, granting
some and denying others. Their procedures, however, have been
quite informal and customarily have not entailed providing writ-
ten opinions or explanations of the decisions.
If one had consulted the Comptroller's regulations at the begin-
ning of 1959 for information on how to obtain approval for a new
bank or a branch, he would have found that the application was
routed through various levels of the agency, with recommendations
attached at each stage,39 but without any form of public hearing. A
field examiner would make an "investigation" of the application,
gathering unspecified kinds of economic and market data and
visiting existing banks in the locale to ask for their views. The ap-
plicant would not know what the investigator turned up, and ob-
jectors would not generally know even what was in the applica-
tion, let alone the examiner's report. On request, an applicant or
objector would usually be given a "conference" with the Regional
Comptroller or another representative, without the presence of
other parties, at which he could voice his opinions on matters that
he thought might be relevant to the outcome. "Among other mat-
ters to be considered" in the case of a new bank charter, the regu-
lations stated, were the six factors enumerated in section 1816 of
title 12 of the United States Code.40 For a branch application, the
regulations listed additional factors:
[T]he number of branches now in operation and their location,
the proposed location of the new branch and the distance
38. See, e.g., 1964 CoMP. CURR. ANN. REP. 2-4.
39. 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.5 (1959).
40. Id. § 4.1(b). A modified version is now contained in 12 C.F.R. § 4.2(b) (1974).
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from the head office, the nearest banking facilities,.... the na-
ture of the potential clientele and possible business available,
including an estimate of contemplated volume within a rea-
sonable period of time and the prospects of successful opera-
tion of the branch together with any other pertinent factors. 41
The process of evaluation whereby these relevant "factors" were
translated into a decision was not described in any published
source available beforehand, and the applicant would know noth-
ing more if ultimately he was turned down: "If the decision is un-
favorable the applicants are so informed. '42 In its entire history,
the Office of the Comptroller had never held a public hearing
on an application nor published a written opinion. 43
Over at the FHLBB, applicants and their opponents were faring
better procedurally but not substantively. The Bank Board cus-
tomarily released charter and branch applications to the public
and scheduled public hearings44 on either a "dispensable" or "non-
dispensable" basis.45 Information concerning the grounds for de-
cision was about as hard to come by, however, as with the Comp-
troller. For charter applicants, the regulations merely required
data "sufficiently detailed and comprehensive to enable the Board
to pass" upon the four statutory criteria; in the case of branch ap-
plications, the regulations required an applicant to
state the need for such branch office; the functions to be per-
formed; the personnel and office facilities to be provided; the
estimated annual volume of business, income, and expenses
of such branch office; and [submit] a proposed annual budget
of such association. 46
How such data eventuated in a grant or denial of the application
was not vouchsafed to the applicant in any form of written opinion,
however, leaving the actual policies of the Board as obscure as
those of the Comptroller.
This state of affairs was not viewed critically by authorities in
administrative law. In its 1941 report, the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure stated, in a passage cher-
ished by the banking agencies:
41. Id. § 4.5(a)(1) (1959).
42. Id. § 4.1(d) (charters); id. § 4.5(a)(3) (branches).
43. Bloom, Hearing Procedures of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 723 (1966).
44. 12 C.F.R. §§ 543. 2 (c), 545.14, 542.2 (1959).
45. See Breisacher, Practice qnd Procedure Before the FHLBB, 16 Bus. LAw. 146, 148 (1960).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 545.14 (1959).
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The Committee recognizes, however, that ... in determining
whether individuals are suited to engage in a banking business,
or whether the community needs the bank, or whether a bank
should be insured and similar questions, a congeries of im-
ponderables is involved, calling for almost intuitive special
judgments so that hearings are not ordinarily useful . . .47
The Attorney General's Committee therefore did not recommend
that the banking agencies be covered by the formal hearing re-
quirements of the proposed legislation, and ultimately they were
not so covered by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.48
Professor Kenneth C. Davis in his Administrative Law Treatise visited
the same area in 1958 and found that all was well:
Probably the outstanding example in the federal govern-
ment of regulation of an entire industry through methods of
supervision, and almost entirely without formal adjudication,
is the regulation of national banks. The regulation of bank-
ing may be more intensive than the regulation of any other in-
dustry, and it is the oldest system of economic regulation. The
system may be one of the most successful, if not the most suc-
cessful. The regulation extends to all major steps in the es-
tablishment and development of a national bank, including
not only entry into the business, changes in status, consolida-
tions, reorganizations, but also the most intensive supervision
of operations through regular examination of banks.
The striking fact is that whereas the non-banking agencies
administer their systems of requiring licenses and approvals
by conducting formal adjudications in most cases involving
controversies, the banking agencies use methods of informal
supervision, almost always without formal adjudication, even
for the determination of controversies....
Even though important groups in the nation are applying
pressures to try further to judicialize the administrative pro-
cess, a close study of the methods of supervision used in the
regulation of banking, as compared with the methods of
determinations on a record of formal proceeding, might well
47. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 142-43 (1941).
48. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237. Technically this is because the require-
ments of section 5 only apply to cases of adjudication "required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," and as is evident the banking stat-
utes do not so require for this class of decisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970); c. United
States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973) (rulemaking); United States X.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1972) (same).
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prove that the nonbanking agencies have a good deal to learn
from the banking agencies. Banking regulation is obviously
superior in its efficiency; if, as those who are regulated seem
generally to believe, banking regulation fully measures up in
qualities of overall fairness, then the only major question re-
maining is relative effectiveness from the standpoint of pro-
tection of the public interest.49
The same attitude prevailed in court when judicial review of a
decision was sought. To begin with, there was no provision in the
National Bank Act or in the Home Owners' Loan Act authorizing
court review of charter and branch decisions. Thus, the only hope
of obtaining review would be an original proceeding in a district
court, probably in the form of an action for an injunction or de-
claratory judgment, and there was considerable doubt as to
whether the Comptroller's decisions were reviewable at all. 50 So far
as reported decisions show, no denied applicant or competing
bank had ever even tried to take the Comptroller to court over a
charter decision, and of course the nature of the applicable stat-
utory standards made the prospects of success in such a proceed-
ing rather uninviting. The branch law, on the other hand, by in-
corporating state law geographical restrictions, 51 posed the pos-
sibility of narrow and specific grounds of difference with the
Comptroller's position, and so cases were undertaken. A denied
applicant lost in Michigan National Bank v. Gidney,52 but did suc-
ceed in obtaining declaratory judgment review. In 1958 the
Comptroller was for the first time enjoined from authorizing a
49. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.04 (1958). Professor Davis's position
had become more critical by 1966. See Davis, Administrative Procedure in the Regulation of
Banking, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 713 (1966).
50. See Stokes, Public Convenience and Advantage in Applications for New Banks and
Branches, 74 BANK. L.J. 921, 930 (1957): "Well informed opinion is that there is no right of
appeal from a decision of the Comptroller of the Currency."
51. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970):
The conditions upon which a national banking association may retain or establish and
operate a branch or branches are the following:
(c) A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city, town or
village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at
the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and (2)
at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such establishment
and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State
in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not
merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location im-
posed by the law of the State on State banks. ...
52. 237 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 847 (1956).
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branch, in National Bank of Detroit v. Wayne Oakland Bank,53 and in
1959 he was enjoined again in Commercial State Bank of Roseville
v. Gidney.5 4 All of those cases involved the question of violation of
state law requirements as to location and did not challenge the
Comptroller's judgment on approval or disapproval as such.
For the Bank Board, the picture was not much different. It had
never been challenged on a charter decision, and the only branch
challenges were to its authority to authorize branches at all 55 and
not to its exercise of discretion in a particular case.
The story of the attempt to obtain review of branch and charter
decisions really begins with FHLBB v. Rowe56 in 1960, and the be-
ginnings were not auspicious. As in most of the early cases, the
grounds primarily relied on were procedural. The plaintiff in
Rowe, a denied charter applicant, contended that he was entitled to
a hearing conducted by the Board in accordance with Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) specifications. The District of Columbia
Circuit not only rejected that contention but went on to suggest
that judicial review of a charter decision would be available, if at
all, only under rather narrow circumstances, noting that Congress
had "clearly reposed in the Board a wide discretion" and had "not
in the Act provided for judicial review of the Board's order.157
In the context of branch applications, the APA-hearing-entitle-
ment argument had already been tried without success, 58 so the
plaintiff in Bridgeport Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
FHLBB5 9 instead attacked the form of Board hearing actually held.
According to the complaint, the hearing was inadequate to satisfy
procedural due process, since it involved restricted opportunity
for cross-examination and denial of access to internal reports and
information upon which the Board relied in approving a com-
petitor's branch application. In upholding the Board, the Third
Circuit saw the hearing as playing a limited and even minor role
in the decision process:
The rulings of the Board are the result of its expert judgment,
its policy, the reports, recommendations and analyses of its
53. 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958).
54. 174 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
55. See text and note at note 36 supra.
56. 284 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
57. Id. at 275, 277.
58. First Nat'l Bank of McKeesport v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Homestead, 225
F.2d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
59. 307 F.2d 580 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950 (1963).
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staff, plus any special evidence it might conclude necessary to
obtain by way of hearing.60
The culmination of such judicial deference was expressed at
about this same time in Community National Bank v. Gidney, 61 when
a competing bank attempted to overturn a branch approval by the
Comptroller on two grounds-not only violation of state law lo-
cation requirements, but also lack of "necessity" for establishment
of the branch. In order to show that the Comptroller had abused
his discretion, plaintiff moved for discovery of documents in the
Comptroller's files relating to the examination and evaluation of
the branch application. The court's response was unequivocal:
In passing on branch applications, the Comptroller must nec-
essarily utilize his great expert knowledge and consider ques-
tions of policy, as well as of fact, with respect to the interest of
the public; coordination with other federal and state super-
visory agencies; and banking conditions in general.
In view of the above cases and considerations, and especially
in view of the failure of Congress to provide any standards
by which this court could determine whether the exercise of
discretion by the Comptroller was "reasonable" or whether it
was "arbitrary", this court is of the opinion that Congress in-
tended that the Comptroller have an exclusive and unreview-
able power of discretion in determining whether or not to ap-
prove the establishment of branch banks pursuant to 12
U.S.C.A. § 36(c). The Court, therefore, is further of the opin-
ion that the discretion provided for in 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(c)
comes within the second exception to Section 10 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and that this court is without juris-
diction to review the action of the Comptroller in the present
case.
62
The full reach of that language implied that the Comptroller could
not be reviewed and reversed by a court even for an unmistak-
enable violation of the state law location requirements of section
36(c) of title 12 of the United States Code, and of course there
was already ample precedent to the contrary on that point.63 It is
not surprising that the district judge later modified his position; 64
yet, if confined to the issue of how far to review a banking agency's
60. Id. at 584.
61. 192 F. Stipp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
62. Id. at 518-19.
63. See text and notes at notes 53-54 supra.
64. See Community Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224, 225 (6th Cir. 1962).
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ultimate judgment in approving or disapproving a charter or
branch, the passage shows an attitude that was pervasive at the
time.
By the early 1960s, then, the licensing decisions of the Comp-
troller and the Bank Board were as impenetrable a mystery-or
"congeries of imponderables"-as ever. Neither policy statements
nor regulations provided a clear understanding of why decisions
came out as they did, and no written opinions were issued at the
end of the process to provide at least retrospective enlightenment.
Competing banks were able to get a court to look at and at times
overrule the Comptroller's constructions of state law branch lo-
cation requirements but otherwise he was having no difficulty
defending his results in court.65 This period proved to be the high-
water mark of judicial deference to the Comptroller's informal
ways and unexplained actions, and the tide turned swiftly.
C. The Smithfield Case and Its Aftermath
The landmark decision came in 1965: First National Bank of Smith-
field v. Saxon.66 It presented the familiar situation of a competing
bank objecting to the Comptroller's approval of a branch, but the
Fourth Circuit came at the problem from an unfamiliar angle. The
plaintiff had won in the district court on the ground that the APA
required the Comptroller to conduct an adversary hearing. 67 The
Fourth Circuit, as had others before it, rejected this argument,
holding that neither the APA nor the requirements of procedural
due process commanded that the Comptroller proceed by way of
an adversary hearing.68
But then the court turned to the question of how, in the absence
of a trial-type hearing and findings based on an evidentiary record,
judicial review could be achieved. As the majority of the panel
saw it, a "substantial evidence" scope of review was out of place
in these circumstances; instead, it remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for a trial de novo:
On the remand of this case, the plaintiff may adduce evi-
dence demonstrating the impermissibility of the Comptroller's
65. See, e.g., Continental Bank v. National City Bank, 245 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio
1965): Bank of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd, 377 F.2d 496
(6th Cir. 1967); Peoples Bank of Trenton v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd,
373 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1967); Commercial Sec. Bank v. Saxon, 236 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C.
1964).
66. 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
67. First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. First Nat'l Bank of E. North Carolina, 232 F. Supp.
725 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
68. First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
1975]
The University of Chicago Law Review
approval of a branch bank at Smithfield. Testimony to the
contrary will be receivable from the Comptroller. The Court
will then find the facts. Thereon, it will judge de novo the val-
idity, in fact and in law, of the Comptroller's final action.
... If after the court has made its fact findings, it then ap-
pears that the decision of the Comptroller is dependent upon
an exercise of discretion, the Court cannot substitute its dis-
cretion for the Comptroller's. However, it can set aside such
a determination if, in the light of the facts found by the Court,
it concludes that the Comptroller has abused, exceeded, or
arbitrarily applied his discretion.69
The problem seen by the majority in trying to "review" a totally
unexplained decision was undeniably real, but the dilemma created
by its solution was effectively pointed out by Judge Sobeloff in dis-
sent:
How can the District Court conduct a proper examination
if the Comptroller has not disclosed what issues he is resolv-
ing? The District Court is told to make its own de novo fact-
findings, but it is still in no position to judge how far the
Comptroller's decision rests upon fact-findings which the
court deems erroneous and how far it is an exercise of discre-
tionary judgment....
The Comptroller has not divulged his mental processes, and
his determinations of fact, rulings of law and exercises of
discretion and judgment are inextricably intermingled. The
District Court is thus placed in the unhappy position of choos-
ing between two equally unacceptable alternatives. Either it
must blindly assume that the Comptroller's discretion rests
upon an adequate basis in fact, in which event the court review
almost inevitably becomes a meaningless gesture; or the Dis-
trict Court, proceeding upon the basis of facts independently
determined by it, must act in ignorance of the nature of the
decision it is reviewing, in which case the court's judgment is
liable to usurp the Comptroller's function.7 0
The course of judicial review since Smithfield can be seen in pre-
cisely the terms Judge Sobeloff predicted: a fluctuation between
the unsatisfactory poles of futility and usurpation.
The latter outcome promptly became evident in Bank of Haw
River v. Saxon.7 1 Finding the Comptroller's hearing inadequate,
69. Id. at 272.
70. Id. at 274.
71. 257 F. Supp. 74 (M.D.N.C. 1966).
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the district court proceeded with review de novo, and in the pro-
cess became Comptroller for a day. On the basis of the testimony
in court, which went "far beyond that which was before the Comp-
troller,' 72 the judge defined the service or trading area of the
branch and concluded that the area was "already considerably
over-banked. Since the present ratio of existing banking offices to
population is far in excess of both State and National averages,
there can be no question but that the existing banks, with resources
well in excess of two billion dollars, amply meet the capital needs of
the Graham-Burlington area. ' 7 The judge also decided that, due
to a slow rate of population growth in the locale, it would not be
economically feasible to establish a new banking facility in the area.
He concluded: "No public interest, need or necessity has been
shown for the establishment of a branch of First National in
Graham, North Carolina, and it is impermissible for the Comp-
troller to approve the establishment of such a branch. '7 4
When the grounds for decision are made explicit, as in Haw
River, it becomes possible to subject them to examination and cri-
tique, and the opinion in Haw River certainly shows the risks that
such scrutiny entails for the decision maker. The ratio of banking
offices to population in a somewhat arbitrarily defined service area,
as compared with state and national averages, had become the
measure of need-a measure that, in the very nature of an aver-
age, would lead to the conclusion that something like half of the
country at any given time is "over-banked", and always will be,
which might lead one to question either the suitability of the mea-
sure or its significance.
From the Comptroller's standpoint, however, the most impor-
tant aspect of a decision like Haw River is that it demonstrated the
potential of de novo review for taking over his functions-not
necessarily performing them more poorly, but depriving him of
one of the major sources of the power and prestige of his office.
Efforts were soon made to extend Smithfield's de novo review to
a theretofore sacrosanct area: charter decisions. In Webster Groves
Trust Co. v. Saxon,7 5 the Comptroller was for the first time subjected
to judicial review of a charter decision, in this instance at the behest
of a competing bank objecting to a grant, but the Eighth Circuit
refused to take the additional step of review by trial de novo.
72. Id. at 79.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 80.
75. 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966).
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The Comptroller is free to exercise his discretion in the grant-
ing of charters, free from any review on the merits of his ac-
tion. However, if the Comptroller acts in excess or abuse of
his legal authority, to this extent his actions are subject to ju-
dicial review, with the burden of proof resting on the party
seeking the review.7 6
Of course, if the Comptroller never disclosed the basis for his ac-
tion, it would be rather difficult for the party seeking review to
show an abuse of discretion. In effect, this was the other pole of
Sobeloff's dilemma: the futility of judicial review.
When a charter case came before the Sixth Circuit in Warren Bank
v. Camp,7 it adopted a more qualified position on the scope of re-
view, reading the branch and charter cases together as conferring
on the district courts "a considerable discretion in determining the
form of review required. 17 8 In this blurring of prior distinctions,
a trial de novo would not be required for every complaint, but only
where the plaintiff had made out "a prima facie case of abuse of
discretion. 17 9 In an effort to do that, plaintiff moved to take the
depositions of the Comptroller and several subordinates, but this
was denied, absent a showing of "a prima facie case of miscon-
duct. '8 0 "What appellant seems to us to seek is an opportunity to
depose the Comptroller in order to probe his mind as to exactly
why he saw fit to exercise his discretion as he did in relation to the
grant of this charter. This appellant clearly was not entitled to
do,"81 noted the court, citing Morgan IV. 82 The result was to sug-
gest that review de novo might be available even in the charter
area, but to establish preconditions that seemed unlikely of ful-
fillment.
Even if the effects of Smithfield were to be largely confined to
branch cases, however, that was still quite enough to have a major
impact on the Comptroller's office. The Smithfield court had
grounded the need for review by trial de novo on the Comptrol-
ler's "unilateral procedure," which, lacking any form of adversary
hearing, deprived his fact findings of "the preferred position ac-
corded by the substantial-evidence rule" and of any "opening-pre-
sumption of correctness. 83 To regain that preferred position, the
76. Id. at 388.
77. 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968).
78. Id. at 56.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1941).
83. First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 1965).
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Comptroller's office in 1966 set about redoing its procedures.8 4
Most of the application and field examiner's report were made
available to the parties, and "conferences" with a member of the
Comptroller's staff were replaced by "hearings" with all parties
present, of which a transcript was kept. The Comptroller even be-
gan preparing written opinions in some contested branch cases in
which litigation was anticipated. The result was to put the Comp-
troller in a position similar to that already achieved by the Bank
Board, so that he was able to offer the reviewing court a fairly
thick record, replete with data and arguments, instead of a mere
order defended by procedural breastworks of burden of proof
and prima facie case.
Under his new procedures, it became the Comptroller's tactic
when confronted with a complaint to submit the administrative
file to the court and move for summary judgment. The administra-
tive file usually had portions deleted as confidential or protected
by executive privilege-for example, when they involved reports
of examination of a bank, intra-agency memoranda, derogatory
letters, or trade secrets. But a good deal of data and testimony
could be found scattered through the record and, in some cases,
brought together in an opinion to justify the agency's conclusion.
The new procedures came back before the Fourth Circuit in
First-Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Camp85 and had the desired ef-
fect. The court found that the Comptroller had provided the "ad-
versary hearing" that was lacking in Smithfield, even if the panel
conducting the hearing before the Regional Comptroller was no
more than "an investigatory or fact-gathering organ, not having
any fact-finding function. '86 Plaintiff was therefore not entitled
to a hearing de novo in the district court; instead, "the scope of re-
view should not be more rigorous than the substantial evidence
rule.18 7 With the aid of the Comptroller's opinion, the court con-
cluded that the substantial evidence test was met, and the branch
approval was upheld. If a sigh of relief issued from the Comptrol-
ler's office, however, it proved to be short lived.
D. The Search for Standards
Another significant decision in the banking field had occurred
in 1966, with the Supreme Court's construction of section 36(c) of
title 12 of the United States Code in First National Bank of Logan v.
84. The following description is taken from Bloom, supa note 43, at 725-26.
85. 409 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1969).
86. Id. at 1090.
87. Id. at 1095.
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Walker Bank & Trust Co. 8 That statute authorized "inside" branches89
for national banks "if such establishment and operation are at the
time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in
question." Utah had a "home office protection" type of branching
law, which forbade banks from opening branches in a municipality
in which other banks were operating, except by buying out one of
the existing banks and taking it over as the branch. The then
Comptroller, James J. Saxon, believed in aggressively expanding
the powers and activities of the national banking system to their
fullest statutory potential; he argued that the Utah statute "ex-
pressly authorized" branching and that was enough for section
36(c). Since in his view the Utah takeover restriction was a mere
specification of "method" not incorporated by section 36(c), the
Comptroller proceeded to authorize de novo branches for two
Utah national banks.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, gave the Comp-
troller short shrift:
It is a strange argument that permits one to pick and choose
what portion of the law binds him. Indeed, it would fly in the
face of the legislative history not to hold that national branch
banking is limited to those States the laws of which permit it,
and even there "only to the extent that the State laws permit
branch banking." Utah clearly permits it "only to the extent"
that the proposed branch takes over an existing bank.
. . . As to the restriction being a "method," we have con-
cluded that since it is part and parcel of Utah's policy, it was
absorbed by the provisions of §§ 36(c)(1) and (2), regardless
of the tag placed upon it.90
In itself, Walker Bank did not seem of great import, since it merely
knocked down an attempt by the Comptroller to let national banks
have de novo branches where state banks could not. But a number
of lower courts started seeing more in it than that.
One of the problems in attempting to review decisions by the
Comptroller under section 36(c) was that the statute contained no
standards whatever for approving branches. Even under a limited
scope of review like the substantial evidence test, it is necessary to
ask: substantial evidence of what? It is possible to more or less duck
the question when the court is deciding for itself, as in Smithfield's
review de novo, or is giving the form of review with little substance,
88. 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
89. See text at notes 31-32 supra.
90. 385 U.S. at 261-62.
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as in telling the plaintiff that he has failed to discharge the burden
of showing an unexplained decision to be arbitrary, but it is harder
for a court to duck while at the same time it is maintaining that
the decision rests on substantial evidence.
In First-Citizens, the Fourth Circuit filled the void by using Walk-
er Bank to incorporate in section 36(c) all the standards and find-
ings required by North Carolina law and not just its restrictions on
the "extent" of branching allowed state banks. North Carolina is
a statewide branching state that does not restrict the "extent" of
branching at all, but it does set certain standards for the exercise
of the state bank commissioner's approval authority:
Such approval shall not be given until he shall [find] (i) that
the establishment of such branch or teller's window will meet
the needs and promote the convenience of the community to
be served by the bank, and (ii) that the probable volume of
business and reasonable public demand in such community
are sufficient to assure and maintain the solvency of said
branch or teller's window and of the existing bank or banks in
said community. 91
Although the Comptroller, with reason, argued that Walker Bank
did not face and decide the question of whether such broad criteria, un-
related to either the geographical location of branches or the
"manner" of obtaining them (by acquisition or de novo establish-
ment), were intended to be imposed on the Comptroller by section
36(c), the general language in the opinion about not picking and
choosing what portion of the law would bind him was apparently
enough to cost him the day; the court held that he was bound by
North Carolina's "need and convenience" and "solvency of the
branch" criteria. The Fourth Circuit conceded that these were
"nebulous concepts, '92 resulting in a "lack of definitive direction,' 93
but at least they were better than the National Bank Act and pro-
vided the court with some basis for purporting to give substantial
evidence review.
The Comptroller, consistently with his view of Walker Bank, had
not expressly made even these vague findings in First-Citizens,
but the court was willing to infer them from the general matters
discussed in his opinion and the fact of his ultimate conclusion of
approval. Although a number of other courts, both before and
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-62(b) (1965), quoted in First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Camp, 409 F.2d 1086, 1090 n.5 (4th Cir. 1969).
92. 409 F.2d at 1091.
93. Id. at 1094.
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after First-Citizens, agreed with the proposition that section 36(c)
incorporated all state law standards and findings, the Comptrol-
ler did not readily acquiesce and continued in many cases to omit
express findings in the terms required by state statutes. 94 Further-
more, after 1971, the Comptroller cut back on the practice, begun
in 1966, of writing opinions in contested branch cases.95
Since the reviewing courts were agreed that Walker Bank made
any required state law findings binding upon the Comptroller,
96
they were in an awkward position. Some courts were willing to con-
tinue to find the necessary state law determinations "implicit" in
the Comptroller's approval and review on that basis.97 On oc-
casion, the Comptroller wrote an opinion after the case went to
court, and made the state law findings expressly. 98 But in other
cases, where there were no opinions and no state law findings, the
court was unwilling to indulge in implications and simply reversed
the Comptroller outright and remanded to him for reconsidera-
tion. 99
The matter came to a head in First National Bank of Catawba
County v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. 100 In a one page per curiam
opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed an injunction against the
Comptroller's issuing a branch certificate: "[W]hen the Comptrol-
ler expressly declined to make the findings required by § 53-62(b),
although he made numerous other findings, he acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in approving Wachovia's application to establish
a branch. . ".."10' Faced with what amounted to a rule of automatic
reversal, the Comptroller gave up and thereafter conceded, at
94. See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 373 F.2d 283, 291 (6th Cir. 1967);
Citizens Nat'l Bank of S. Md. v. Camp, 317 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (D. Md. 1970); Industrial
State Bank v. Camp, 284 F. Supp. 900, 902-03 (W.D. Mich. 1968), vacated as moot, 421 F.2d
1361 (6th Cir. 1969).
95. Cf. Clermont Nat'l Bank v. Citizensbank, 329 F. Supp. 1331, 1336 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
The practice had in any event been largely devoted to North Carolina cases.
96. This conclusion was somewhat strengthened by the citation of Walker Bank in First
Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 130 (1969), for the proposition that
state law controls "when, where, and how" branches may be authorized for national banks.
See also id. at 139 (Douglas, J., dissenting but agreeing with proposition stated).
97. See, e.g., Clermont Nat'l Bank v. Citizensbank, 329 F. Supp. 1331, 1344-45 (S.D.
Ohio 1971); First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks v. Camp, 326 F. Supp. 541, 545 (D.D.C. 1971),
aft'd, 465 F.2d 586, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1124 (1973). Cf. Farmers
Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 345 F. Supp. 622, 629 (D. Md. 1971).
98. See, e.g., Citizens Nat'l Bank in Gastonia v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 329 F.
Supp. 585 (M.D.N.C. 1971).
99. See, e.g., Citizens Nat'l Bank of S. Md. v. Camp, 317 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Md. 1970).
100. 448 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1971).
101. Id. at 638.
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least in the Fourth Circuit, that he was bound by state law findings
requirements. 02
What had been gained, or lost, in this running battle? The
Comptroller apparently feared that his approval discretion would
be hobbled by a tangle of state statutory findings and fought tena-
ciously to avoid it. Most state statutes, however, where they con-
tained any standards at all, were as "nebulous" and lacking in "de-
finitive direction" as the Fourth Circuit found North Carolina's
to be, 10 3 or as the Comptroller's own earlier list of "pertinent fac-
tors."'1 4 By the same token, reviewing courts actually gained little
in the way of standards or findings by which to examine a record
for substantial supporting evidence. In any but a superficial sense,
the Comptroller was about as free and the courts as much at sea
as before. Looking ahead, it was possible that the state standards
would gradually undergo a process of judicial construction and
administrative interpretation that would give them real meaning,
and perhaps it was this kind of development that the Comptroller
sought to avoid.' 05 For the moment, however, it made little real
difference if the Comptroller was forced to express his conclusion
in terms of boilerplate findings like "needs and convenience" and
"public advantage" taken from state statutes.
E. Probing the Comptroller's Mind and Files
Although the Comptroller has under duress provided some
form of opinion or findings at times in branch cases, charter de-
cisions are another story. The Comptroller has never written an
opinion in a charter case, and the courts have tended to regard
his discretion in charter decisions as especially unfettered and
their scope of review as correspondingly more narrow. For over a
century the Comptroller was never taken to court over a charter
decision, so far as the records show. The first party to do so was a
competing bank complaining of a charter approval, in Webster Groves
102. Bank of New Bern v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 643, 646 (E.D.N.C.
1972). In other circuits, the Comptroller has continued to resist. See, e.g., First Bank &
Trust Co. %. Smith, 509 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1975).
103. See text and note at note 92 supra.
104. 12 C.F.R. § 4.5(a)(I) (1959); see text and note at note 41 supra. This regulation was
revoked on Feb. 14, 1963 (28 Fed. Reg. 1584), and has not been subsequently replaced by
any list of a similar nature.
105. However, state interpretations of state standards have not thus far been accorded
much of a role tinder section 36(c). See, e.g., First Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith, 509 F.2d
663, 666 n.2 (1st Cir. 1975); First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks v. Camp, 465 F.2d 586, 593-97
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1124 (1973); Howell v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank of
Ridgewood, 385 F.2d 528, 530 (3d Cir. 1967).
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Trust Co. v. Saxon.'06 The Comptroller contended his action was
not subject to judicial review and plaintiff had no standing, con-
tentions that run through many of these cases with a uniform lack
of success.10 7 But if his decision was in principle reviewable, the
absence of any opinion or explanation made review undeniably
difficult. The court handled the case before it by putting on the
plaintiff the burden of showing that the Comptroller had abused
his authority, and then holding that burden unmet. 08
Under the circumstances, how could the burden be met? Ob-
viously, the plaintiff would have to find out the reasoning that
had led the Comptroller to his conclusion before he could demon-
strate something wrong with it. In Warren Bank v. Camp,10 9 the
plaintiff was denied the right to seek that information directly by
taking the depositions of the Comptroller and several subordi-
nates."10 The only other possibility was careful examination of the
administrative file, in the hope that internal memoranda and rec-
ommendations would disclose the basis upon which the final de-
cision was made, and a number of cases tried to pursue such an ex-
amination.
It was an approach with inherent limitations-what would you
learn about the reasoning behind the Comptroller's approval of
a charter if, for example, what the file contained was staff mem-
oranda recommending denial? That was the situation in Sterling
National Bank of Davie v. Camp,"' but there was a thick file " 'replete
with evidence which would support either view,' 112 and the court
was untroubled:
Although we cannot chart the subjectives of his discretionary
decision, it was obviously based on a composite of many factors
and much data. To say that one fact was erroneous and that
another fact was askew is not to infest the Comptroller's ex-
ercise of discretion with the scent of arbitrariness or capricious-
ness sufficient to set aside his decision. 13
In other words, the Comptroller might have some of his facts
wrong, but since you couldn't tell what his reasoning process was,
106. 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966).
107. They were finally laid to rest by Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970), and Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
108. See text and notes at notes 75-76 supra.
109. 396 F.2d 52, 56 (6th Cir. 1968).
110. See text and notes at notes 77-82 supra.
111. 431 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970), cel. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971).
112. Id. at 516.
113. 14. at 517.
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there was no way to be sure it made a difference, and the plaintiff
loses again.
In Olsen v. Camp, 1 4 the plaintiff was for the first time a charter
applicant seeking judicial review of a denial, a category of case in
which going to court is even more unrewarding because of the
limited remedy available.'1 5 The plaintiff sought discovery of the
administrative file, but the Comptroller claimed executive priv-
ilege for a substantial portion relating to the applicant group's
background and connection to certain other banks with which the
banking agencies were having supervisory differences. Since it
seemed likely this was the primary ground of the decision in the
case, the court was unwilling to simply uphold the claim; it ordered
some of the documents produced and the rest submitted to it in
camera for review, partial excision, and release.
Similarly, in Klanke v. Camp 16 the court ordered the Comptrol-
ler to release to the plaintiffs "all Government records pertaining
to the denial of plaintiffs' charter application," ' 1 7 though it later
allowed part to be withheld. But the court itself characterized ob-
taining judicial review based on the administrative file as "a hol-
low victory," since the Comptroller would be "insulated fromjudicial
interference merely upon evidencing a minimal basis in reason
for his denial."' 1 8 The accuracy of that characterization was sub-
sequently borne out, when the Comptroller obtained summary
judgment because the plaintiffs had not discharged the "onerous
burden" of showing that the Comptroller's decision was "totally
devoid of any rational foundation."'" 9
There were also attempts in some of the branch cases to open up
the administrative file more fully, in an effort to ascertain the
basis for decisions. Thus, the protestant in Citizens National Bank
of Southern Maryland v. Camp' 20 wanted to know the full content of
114. 328 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
115. If a competing bank prevails in a challenge to a branch or charter approval, it gets
an injunction and thereby blocks or delays the additional competition. But if an applicant
were to successfully challenge a denial, it would not get an order to the Comptroller to is-
sue the desired approval, for that would in effect be mandamus relief which is not available
in so judgmental and discretionary an area. See, e.g., Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Man-
dawn and Venue Act oJ 1962 and "Nonstatntoiy"Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action,
81 HARV. L. REv. 308, 332 (1967). Instead, it would get a remand to the Comptroller with
instructions to correct his errors and reconsider, a prize of dubious value if the Comptrol-
ler remains unfavorably inclined.
116. 320 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
117. Id. at 1188.
118. Id.
119. Klanke v. Camp, 327 F. Supp. 592, 593-94 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
120. 317 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Md. 1970).
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the application and administrative file, parts of which had been
withheld as confidential. He obtained a judicial order that, after
remand, any undisclosed material should be submitted to the
court in a sealed record for in camera inspection.
Over the course of the decade, therefore, the Comptroller had
been forced to reveal most of the administrative file on branch
and charter decisions, though he was still keeping a portion of it
confidential, at least from litigants. Once revealed, however, it
proved only moderately enlightening. For a court concerned only
lest the Comptroller be doing something totally absurd or unfair,
the contents of the file were generally sufficient to support an af-
firmance. But for anyone seeking to understand the Comptroller's
values and policies and reasoning process, a file filled with varied
and conflicting views of subordinates provided disappointingly
little help.
F. The Renewed Assault
To sum up "progress" by 1971, then, the Comptroller had been
led, or coerced, into adopting a more formalized hearing proce-
dure. As revised anew in 1971,121 the Comptroller's regulations
required notice by publication of applications for branches or
charters, and the Regional Administrator of the Comptroller's of-
fice was required to notify local banks.122 On request, a hearing
would be held, primarily as an opportunity for protestants to
voice their objections. The application and field examiner's re-
port and any filed objections were part of the public file, except to
the extent parts were excluded as confidential.' 23 At the hearing,
the applicant would usually introduce his application and rest,
leaving it to the protestants to call witnesses (whose attendance
was voluntary and testimony unsworn) and submit evidence.
Though all parties were in the dark as to the Comptroller's pre-
cise standards, if any, there was a customary pattern-the protes-
tant would try to show that the described service area was too
large, that when properly drawn it was overbanked already, and
that the local economy was stagnant, while the applicant would try
121. 36 Fed. Reg. 6888 (1971).
122. 12 C.F.R. § 5.2 (1974).
123. Id. at § 5.3. Most of the exclusions are based on claims that the information con-
sists of either business trade secrets or derogatory comments on the applicant or protestants.
Reliance on the latter raises problems familiar from the days of the employee loyalty/secur-
ity programs. Cf. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 866 (1961);
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). But in very few cases do such considerations seem
to be of actual importance in the outcome. See text at note 214 infra.
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to show the opposite. A transcript would be kept, at the protes-
tant's expense, which if counsel were adept would be " 'replete with
evidence which would support either view'" and contain "many
factors and much data." 12 4 Some time thereafter, the Comptroller
would announce that he had approved or disapproved the appli-
cation.
If it was a charter case, the Comptroller never wrote an explana-
tory opinion, though when he was taken to court in Klanke v.
Camp125 he did submit an affidavit which "explained" his denial on
all available grounds.126 By restricting its scope of review and put-
ting all the burden on plaintiff, the court was able to find such a
purely conclusory "explanation", or none at all, sufficient.
For a while, the Comptroller wrote opinions in some branch
cases, but then he decided to cut back. Under the new practice,
apparently the Comptroller would wait to see if suit was filed, and
then supply some explanation if necessary by requesting a remand
for that purpose 27 or by simply mailing out a belated opinion. 28
The courts insisted that the Comptroller's opinion or administra-
tive file in some way support the findings required by state law,
but those too were "nebulous" and unhelpful.
In short, half a dozen years of litigation through numerous cases
had accomplished remarkably little in understanding just why the
Comptroller decided as he did.' 29 Once again, judicial patience
wore thin, and a series of reversals for the Comptroller followed.
The district court in Bank of New Bern v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co.13 0 contemplated North Carolina's nebulous standards for
branches and felt "constrained to establish its own guidelines,"
coming up with a list of seven factors.' 3 ' The court then applied
124. See text and notes at notes 111-13 supra.
125. 320 F. Stipp. 1185 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
126. The Comptroller informed the court that he
was convinced, among other reasons, that there was no adequate need for a banking
facility at the proposed location; that the ability and experience of the proposed or-
ganizers was instfficient; that the requested new bank wotld not be successful under
its proposed leadership; that the objects contemplated by the Natiqnal Bank Act
would not be served; and that the granting of the charter application would be
detrimental to the public interest.
Id.
127. See, e.g., Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 345 F. Supp. 622, 624 (D. Md. 1971).
128. See Citizens Nat'l Bank in Gastonia v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 329 F. Supp.
585, 586 (M.D.N.C. 1971).
129. In 1969 Professor Davis thought he could discern a significant trend in the Comp-
troller's office toward reasoned opinions and controlled discretion, but the trend unfor-
tunately died a-borning. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 120-26 (1969).
130. 353 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
131. Id. at 647-48.
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these factors to the record evidence and Comptroller's opinion,
attached its own weights, concluded that there would not be sub-
stantial evidence to support an approval, and accordingly granted
the plaintiff summary judgment against the Comptroller. New Bern
is not far removed from Haw River' 32 in its willingness to take over
the Comptroller's function, though it employed the language of
substantial evidence review rather than review de novo.
In Pitts v. Camp,'133 the Fourth Circuit encountered its first case
of charter review. Apparently there were no serious protestants,
for no hearing on the application was requested or held. The
Comptroller disapproved the application and as usual wrote no opin-
ion, simply informing the applicant by letter that:
On the basis of information developed by our Field Investi-
gation, together with all other pertinent data relating to the
proposal, we have concluded that the factors in support of the
establishment of a new National Bank in this area are not
favorable. 34
Upon requesting and receiving reconsideration and submitting
additional data, the applicant group got a letter of renewed denial
and a glimmer of further explanation: "[W]e were unable to reach
a favorable conclusion as to the need factor. The record reflects
that this market area is now served. . .. ,,135 The letter then listed
one bank, two savings and loans and one credit union servicing
the market area, which in no way distinguished the locale from a
great many others in which the outcofhe had been favorable.
Instead of manipulating procedural rules and a narrow scope of
review to sustain the Comptroller's ruling, the Fourth Circuit
pronounced it "unacceptable." "It does not comply with the bare,
fundamental principle of agency decision: that its basis must be
stated.' 1 6 The court cited FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. 137 and
Chenery 1138 for the proposition that the "orderly functioning of
the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the
administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed ... ."39 The court
132. See text and notes at notes 71-74 supra.
133. 463 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), remanded, 477 F.2d 593
(4th Cir. 1973).
134. Id. at 633. This is the standard letter of denial.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
138. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
139. 463 F.2d at 633.
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remanded the case to the district court for a trial de novo, since
the Comptroller had twice "inadequately and inarticulately re-
solved the appellants' presentation."'140 In essence, seven years
after Smithfield, the court was back about where it started and again
had recourse to review de novo as a means of putting pressure on
the Comptroller to change his practices.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
took a different tack in Wood County Bank v. Camp,'4 in form a
protestant's appeal from a charter approval. 42 The district court
found what none before it had been able to find-a fifth amend-
ment procedural due process requirement for findings and reasons
by the Comptroller to support his decision, which the court char-
acterized as adjudicatory in nature. 43 Although the court could
muster little precedent for that requirement, it offered a number
of "practical reasons" that it found compelling:
The foremost of these is the facilitation of judicial review.
The Court is confronted here with an Administrative
Record of over a thousand pages of testimony, complex tech-
nical data, and recommendations of the investigating National
Bank Examiner and various members of the Comptroller's
staff. For the Court to properly review such a record in as
complex an area as the banking field and without the benefit
of the Comptroller's underlying reasoning cannot expeditious-
ly be done. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said . . . "We must know
what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say
whether it is right or wrong."...
A second important reason for requiring findings is to pre-
vent a reviewing Court from usurping the administrative fact-
finding function. For a Court to refrain from such encroach-
ment of administrative function, a Court must know what
facts were found....
A third practical reason for administrative findings is to
protect against careless or arbitrary action.144
140. Id. at 634.
141. 348 F. Supp. 1321 (D.D.C. 1972), vacated, 489 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
142. The substance was closer to a branch approval: the applicant was an existing bank,
applying for a new charter as a branch-substitute in a unit banking state.
143. 348 F. Supp. at 1325.
144. Id. at 1326-27 (footnotes omitted).
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The court therefore ordered the case remanded to the Comp-
troller to supply findings and conclusions "sufficient for the
Court to grant Plaintiff the judicial review to which it is entitled."' 4 5
In increasing trouble once more, the Comptroller appealed Wood
County Bank to the District of Columbia Circuit and took Pitts to
the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari.
G. Pitts and its Interpretation
The Comptroller in Camp v. Pitts146 did not challenge before the
Supreme Court the Fourth Circuit's holding that his letters of ex-
planation were inadequate for judicial review,147 but he did attack
the procedure of remand to the district court for trial de novo.
The Supreme Court agreed:
It is quite plain from our decision in Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v. Volpe ... that de novo review is appropriate only
where there are inadequate factfinding procedures in an ad-
judicatory proceeding .... [T]he only deficiency suggested in
agency action or proceedings is that the Comptroller inade-
quately explained his decision. As Overton Park demonstrates,
however, that failure, if it occurred in this case, is not a defi-
ciency in factfinding procedures such as to warrant the de
novo hearing ordered in this case.' 48
Instead, said the Court, the proper remedy for an inadequate
explanation is to get more, by way of either affidavits or testimony,
to add to the administrative record. Since the Comptroller had al-
ready indicated the "determinative reason" for his denial, 49 that
was the ground that had to be supportable on the record with the
aid of the additional explanation. 50 If it was not, then the proper
145. Id. at 1329.
146. 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
147. 463 F.2d at 633-34.
148. 411 U.S. at 141-42. De novo findings of fact and determination of the ultimate re-
sult should be distinguished from de novo review on questions of law; courts routinely re-
view questions of law de novo in appeals from administrative decisions. See Seattle Trust &
Sav. Bank v. Bank of Cal., 492 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1974).
149. In the Court's rendition, this reason was "the finding that a new bank was an un-
economic venture in light of the banking needs and the banking services already available
in the surrounding community." 411 U.S. at 143.
150. The appropriate standard of review for this purpose, the Court also held, was that
of section 10(e)(2)(A) of the APA: "whether the Comptroller's adjudication was 'arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.' "Id. at 142, quot-
ingfrom 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). The "substantial evidence" test was deemed appropri-
ate for reviewing findings based on a hearing record, which the statutes in question here do
not require. 411 U.S. at 141. Presumably, the former standard is a less demanding one af-
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course was to vacate the Comptroller's decision and remand to him
for further consideration.
The Supreme Court therefore seemed to take away the only
club the Fourth Circuit had found effective in trying to change the
Comptroller's ways--de novo review. That method had always in-
volved a more or less open intrusion upon the functions assigned
to the Comptroller by Congress, and was therefore inappropriate,
as the Court declared. What was regrettable was the Court's ap-
parent unawareness of the eight years of running struggle between
the Comptroller and the lower courts, in which effective judicial
review had been frustrated determinedly and continuously.
On the other hand, the Court certainly left the door open for
the lower courts to force explanations that they could find com-
prehensible. Indeed, as Pitts made clear, Overton Park had limited
the rule of Morgan IV, about not probing into the mental processes
of decision makers by deposition or examination as witnesses, to
situations in which the decision maker had made formal findings
on a record. 15 That overruled Warren v. Camp152 and other cases
holding that the Comptroller could not be examined or deposed,
and if litigants pursued the opportunity it would become a new
club of some force. If the Comptroller's inevitable objections about
the burden on his office were not received sympathetically, he
would almost surely move to forestall the embarrassments of cross-
examination by providing fuller explanations-if not in contem-
poraneous opinions then through litigation affidavits. And if he
did not, the court was free to remand.
But if the door to more intelligible explanation was still open,
the general tenor of the opinion in Pitts was not very encouraging.
This can best be shown by examining how lower courts have sub-
sequently used or construed Pitts. The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit vacated Wood County Bank and remanded it to the district
court for reconsideration in light of Pitts, and the district court felt
constrained to grant the Comptroller's motion for summary judg-
fording narrower review, but the distinctions involved have never been very clear. For ex-
ample, would a finding not supported by evidence that was at least substantial not also be an
abuse of discretion? Courts now know which language to use, but it is not evident that they
will go about their job much differently; a district court subsequently considered the ques-
tion in Grenada Bank v. Watson, 361 F. Supp. 728, 733 (N.D. Miss. 1973), affid, 488 F.2d
1056 (5th Cir. 1974), and found "no substantial difference" between the two standards.
More recent and authoritative, if not more enlightening, discussion may be found in Bow-
man Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 95 S. Ct. 438, 441-42 (1974).
151. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
152. 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968). See text and notes at notes 77-82 supra.
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ment, though not without considerable protest. 153 The court con-
cluded with a plaint that in cases like Pitts judicial review was im-
possible and with a plea to Congress to put the Comptroller under
the hearings and findings requirements of the APA.
In First National Bank of Homestead v. Watson,154 a competitor
challenge to a charter approval, the court cited Pitts for the prop-
osition that, absent a showing that his action was arbitrary or
capricious, the Comptroller was under no obligation to explain
his decision.' 55 In Grenada Bank v. Watson,' 56 the Comptroller had
without opinion approved a branch on the basis of the usual thick
hearing record plus brief and conflicting recommendations from
subordinates; the court went back to implying state law findings
and noting that the record contained evidence that might, on
some theory, support them. Pitts was cited to the effect that the
Comptroller's decision must be upheld unless the record indicates
that it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
not in accordance with law .... -157
The plaintiff in Bank of Commerce of Laredo v. City National Bank
of Laredo'58 requested remand to the district court to obtain from
the Comptroller some explanation of his charter approval as a
branch substitute for the defendant, but was turned down flatly
by the Fifth Circuit in a remarkably obtuse opinion. The court
cited Morgan IV and the pre-Overton Park banking cases for the
proposition that the plaintiff was barred by the "preponderant
weight of judicial precedent" from deposing the Comptroller or
requiring him to answer interrogatories. 159 Overton Park itself was
ignored, and Pitts was cited as a recent affirmance of this policy,
though the opinion had said the exact opposite. 160 The real point
153. [I]n the case at Bar the Comptroller attempted to explain in three short sentences
his analysis of 1000 pages of economic data contained in the administrative record....
The Comptroller explained his determinative reasons for the action taken by stating
summarily that the new bank would serve the convenience and needs of the relevant
market and have no serious effect on the existing institutions now serving the general
area. Under present requirements of procedural due process governing the Comptrol-
ler's decisions ... the Court is constrained to deem the Comptroller's explanation suf-
ficient.
Wood County Bank v. Camp, Civil No. 1277-72 (D.D.C., May 24, 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d
1063 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See WASH. FIN. REP., at T-2 (June 4, 1973).
154. 363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973).
155. Id. at 468.
156. 361 F. Supp. 728 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd, 488 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1974).
157. Id. at 735.
158. 484 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
159. Id. at 287.
160. "If, as the Court of Appeals held and as the Comptroller does not now contest,
there was such failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judicial re-
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in Laredo was that the Fifth Circuit did not in that case feel any
need for additional explanation to undertake judicial review,161
and that in turn rested upon a willingness to hold the Comptroller
to a generous and undemanding standard-the court was willing
to glean from the staff recommendations and a "voluminous rec-
ord" what "surely" was the determinative reason for the ap-
proval.1 62
In Merchants & Planters Bank v. Smith1 63 the district court ap-
plied the limited scope of review of Pitts to a branch approval, sug-
gesting it was sufficient if the Comptroller's determination had "a
rational basis in fact."1 64 Untroubled by the lack of any findings,
conclusions, or opinion, the court pieced together conflicting file
memoranda and constructed what it felt "the agency thinking" must
have been. Needless to say, the Comptroller was sustained.
The only contrary note was First National Bank of Fayetteville v.
Smith,165 reversing the Comptroller's approval of a charter in a
manner reminiscent of Haw River.166 The recommendations of
subordinates having gone four to one against approval, the court
concluded that the Comptroller must have accepted and relied
upon the grounds given in the one favorable recommendation, and
that advice became in effect the Comptroller's findings to be tested
against the record.167 After noting that the standard for review was
whether the Comptroller's action was arbitrary or capricious, or
had no rational basis in the record, the court then waded through
the record-considering how much capital would be adequate,
choosing one expert over another on the bank's earnings prospects,
judging whether the "need" would be better met by branches,
and weighing the qualifications of the applicant group and pro-
posed managing officer. Subsequently, however, the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed this decision on the ground that the district judge,
though stating the correct standard of review, had actually exer-
cised an independent judgment in place of that of the Comptrol-
view, the remeldy was not to hold a de novo hearing but, as contemplated by Overton Park,
to obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testimony, such additional explana-
tion of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove necessary." Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.
138, 142-43 (1973).
161. 484 F.2d at 288.
162. Id.
163. 380 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
164. Id. at 356.
165. 365 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Ark. 1973).
166. See text and notes at notes 71-74 supra.
167. 365 F. Supp. at 904.
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ler; 168 the failure of the Comptroller to provide even a hint as to
how his own judgment had been arrived at occasioned no adverse
comment at all.
So judicial review of the Comptroller's decisions that is both
limited and intelligent seems to be a goal that is as far away as
ever. Even without trial de novo, there still seems to be only the
unattractive choice between pro forma endorsement and taking
over the policy judgments that were supposed to be the duty of
the Comptroller. An intermediate role for the courts is simply not
feasible unless the Comptroller can and will provide a clear and
consistent explanation of what he is doing, and that has not been
forthcoming.
H. The FHLBB Revisited
Meanwhile, during what for the Comptroller was a most tur-
bulent decade, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has sailed
along with remarkably little disturbance. It is true that the Bank
Board had no state law limitations on branches 69 to raise issues of
interpretation and lead to litigation, and also that the Board was
from the outset willing to hold hearings and build up a record for
court inspection. The Board's position was therefore much less
vulnerable than the Comptroller's; there were fewer obvious
points of attack. And certainly early decisions like Rowe170 and
Bridgeport Federal'7l would be discouraging to any would-be liti-
gant. 172
But as the Comptroller's judicial battles created new doctrines,
some of them had a clear potential for application to the Board
as well. And in 1970 the Board amended its rules for charter and
branch applications,17 3 reducing the trial-type hearing that it had
168. First Nat'l Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1974), petition
for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1975) (No. 963).
169. Except to the extent the Board has imposed them on itself by regulation. See Lyons
Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. FHLBB, 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. I1. 1974); 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b)(1)
(1974).
170. FHLBB v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See text and notes at notes 56-57
supra.
171. Bridgeport Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. FHLBB, 307 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1962). See
text and notes at notes 59-60 supra.
172. These decisions were reinforced by some of the observations about the Board's
"exclusive discretion" in Central Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chariton v. FHLBB, 293 F. Supp. 617,
623-24 (S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 504, 507 (8th Cir. 1970), which upheld the Board's
authority to permit federal savings and loans to operate "mobile facilities," a sort of travel-
ing branch.
173. See 35 Fed. Reg. 2509, 2510-12 (1970).
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been holding for many years to a procedure involving the submis-
sion of written protests and an opportunity for brief oral argu-
ment thereon.
74
New attacks by competing associations were, nevertheless, as
unsuccessful as before. In Guaranty Savings & Loan Association v.
FHLBB 175 the court upheld this truncated "oral argument" pro-
cedure, and seemed to suggest that the Board's discretion over
branching was so wide as to constrict judicial review almost to the
point of nonexistence. And in Benton Savings & Loan Association v.
FHLBB 176 the Board's resolution of branch approval in conclusory
boilerplate was likewise sustained, the court noting that Pitts had
been construed "to relieve the Comptroller and, by analogy, the
Home Loan Bank Board of any obligation to state with specificity
the reasons for their decision."'' 77
In 1974 the Board carried this truncation process yet another
step, amending the branch regulation to make oral argument avail-
able to a competitor only if it had filed a "substantial" protest. 78
In theory, this ever-widening divergence from the model of de-
cisions based upon evidentiary hearings is going to increase the risk
that a court will hold the agency's factfinding procedures inade-
quate; the Supreme Court in Overton Park listed that conclusion as
one of the two grounds that would justify de novo review. 79 Yet so
far the courts have not developed the same disenchantment with
the Board's decision making that the Comptroller has managed
to evoke, and the evident possibility seems but a distant cloud.18 0
II. SECONDARY APPROVALS
Next we turn, more briefly, to the role of federal banking agen-
cies with respect to state-chartered institutions. A state agency
is the primary supervisor for such institutions, making decisions
174. 12 C.F.R. §§ 543.2(e), (f) and 545.14(g), (h) (1971).
175. 330 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1971).
176. 365 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
177. Id. at 1104. The Board has, however, written opinions in letter form since 1968 in
some cases where litigation was anticipated, and has said that its present policy is to issue
explanatory opinions whenever requested.
178. 39 Fed. Reg. 789 (1974). This is in line with the Bank Board's current "general
policy . . . to encourage expansion through branching:" see 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b)(5) (1974),
which also contains the wonderfully elusive warning that protests "will have to be increas-
ingly persuasixe" to have any effect.
179. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
180. The most recent tranquil acceptances of the Board's branch procedures are to be
found in Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. I1l. 1974) and Elm
Gro~e Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, Civil No. 72-C-305 (E.D. Wis., Mar. 3, 1975).
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on charter and branch approvals and otherwise regulating their
investments and activities. But access to federal deposit insurance
is controlled by federal agencies and is for practical purposes as
necessary to commencement of operations as a charter.181 In ad-
mitting state institutions to membership and thereby to deposit
insurance, therefore, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation perform a sort of secondary charter ap-
proval function. Likewise, when a bank gets approval for a branch
from its state supervisor, it also has to obtain approval from the
FRB or, if not a member of the Federal Reserve System, from the
FDIC. There is, however, no counterpart requirement for insured
savings and loans to get branch approval from the FSLIC.
In performing these secondary approval functions, particularly
for branches, one would expect the federal agencies to play a nar-
rower and more limited role than the primary supervisor making
the initial determination; but the process is not wholly an auto-
matic endorsement of what the state has approved. Although the
court cases are few, the general picture is not dissimilar to the one
we have traced for primary approvals: a dearth of standards, a
lack of hearings, and the absence of opinions.
A. Federal Reserve Board
A state bank desiring membership in the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem makes application to the system's Board of Governors "under
such rules and regulations as it may prescribe"; 18 2 by way of stan-
dards the statute merely states that the Board "shall consider the
financial condition of the applying bank, the general character
of its management, and whether or not the corporate powers ex-
ercised are consistent with the purposes" of the Federal Reserve
Act.'8 3 The "financial condition" factor is amplified somewhat by
the requirement that a bank may not be admitted to membership
"unless it possesses capital stock and surplus which, in the judg-
ment of the Board . . .are adequate in relation to the character
and condition of its assets and to its existing and prospective de-
posit liabilities and other corporate responsibilities.' 84 In addition,
for a newly organized state bank that is not already insured, the
181. See Tables 1 & 2, p. 237 supra.
182. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
183. Id. § 322.
184. Id. § 329.
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Board must certify to the FDIC that it has "considered" the list of
six factors contained in section 6 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act. 18 5 The rules and regulations prescribed by the Board for
membership applications are to be found in Regulation H,18 6 which
consists primarily of an assemblage of the pertinent statutory pro-
visions and is thus not informative about additional bases of de-
cision.
For the establishment of branches by a state member bank, the
approval of the FRB must be obtained. 8 7 The statute says nothing
whatever about approval standards, and the regulation merely
notes that the request for approval "should be accompanied by
advice as to the scope of the functions and the character of the busi-
ness which . . . will be performed by the branch and detailed in-
formation regarding the policy . . . proposed to be followed with
reference to supervision of the branch by the head office .... ,,188
There are no reported cases challenging either approvals or
denials of membership or branch applications. In Apfel v. Mellon, 89
the petitioner sought mandamus to force the FRB to approve an
application to form an Edge Act corporation,' 90 another vehicle
for engaging in foreign banking; the argument was over whether
the statutory reference to approval by the FRB imported the ex-
ercise of judgment and discretion, and the court held that it did.
And in Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin'9' there is one judge's
comment that, as to branches, "[s]ince 12 U.S.C.A. § 321 incor-
porates the policy of Section 36, the Board's discretion over state
member banks must be construed as broadly as that of the Comp-
troller of the Currency.' '192
185. Id. § 1814. See text and note at note 25 supra.
186. 12 C.F.R. § 208 (1974). See also 12 C.F.R. § 265.2(f)(26) (1974).
187. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1970). This has been construed to apply only to de novo estab-
lishment and not to acquisition of branches by merger. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v.
Martin, 281 F.2d 61 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The distinction is now moot since the Board's ap-
proval must be obtained anyway for a merger in which a state member bank is the sur-
viving party, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(B) (1970).
188. 12 C.F.R. § 208(c) (1973). The FRB has delegated its authority to approve domes-
tic branches to the regional Federal Reserve Banks and to the Director of the Division of
Supervision and Regulation, in a manner that contains additional standards. 12 C.F.R.
§ 265.2(f)(1), (c)(10) (1974). For foreign branches, the Board exercises approval authority
over national banks as well. 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 213.3(a) (1974). If a branch
is denied, the Board will provide a "simple statement" of the grounds. 12 C.F.R. § 2 62 . 3 (e)
(1974).
189. 33 F.2d 805 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
190. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 611 et seq. (1970).
191. 281 F.2d 61 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
192. Id. at 68 (dissenting opinion).
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B. FDIC
When a state bank that is not a member of the Federal Reserve
System applies for deposit insurance, the FDIC is supposed to "con-
sider" the six factors which we have already noted' 93 and also to
"determine, upon the basis of a thorough examination of such
bank, that its assets in excess of its capital requirements are ade-
quate to enable it to meet all of its liabilities to depositors and
other creditors as shown by the books of the bank,"' 94 a require-
ment designed for operating banks rather than newly formed ones.
The same six factors are to be considered by the FDIC in deciding
whether to approve new branches for insured state banks that
are not FRS members. 95 The regulations add nothing except
some information about application forms and where to file
them. 196
There are no reported cases involving judicial review of FDIC
decisions on membership and branch applications. 197
C. FSLIC
The provisions governing applications for insurance of accounts
by state chartered savings and loans' 98 are to be found in section
1726(c) of title 12 of the United States Code:
The Corporation shall reject the application of any appli-
cant if it finds that the capital of the applicant is impaired or
that its financial policies or management are unsafe; and the
Corporation may reject the application of any applicant if it
finds that the character of the management of the applicant or
its home financing policy is inconsistent with economical home
financing or with the purposes of this subchapter.... In con-
sidering applications for such insurance the Corporation shall
give full consideration to all factors in connection with the fi-
193. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1970). See text at note 25 supra.
194. 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1970).
195. Id. § 1828(d).
196. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 303.1, 303.2, 303.10, 304.3 (1973). Authority to approve branches,
if certain conditions are met, has been delegated to the Director of the Division of Bank
Supervision. 12 C.F.R. §§ 303.1 1(a)(7), 303.12(c) (1974).
197. The nearest approach is Magellsen v. FDIC, 341 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1972), a
tort action for money damages against the FDIC which was dismissed for failure to follow
the procedures required by the Federal Tort Claims Act; it contains some general references
to the FDIC's discretion in passing on insurance applications.
198. It is the "duty" of the FSLIC to insure the accounts of federal savings and loans.
The FSLIC is run by the three-man Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which charters fed-
eral savings and loans; for federal associations, therefore, the insurance decision is essen-
tially part of the chartering decision.
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nancial condition of applicants and insured institutions, and
shall have power to make such adjustments in their financial
statements as the Corporation finds to be necessary. 199
In these applications, since a newly organized savings and loan
will not have impaired capital and normally will assert that its fi-
nancial and home financing "policies" will be whatever is necessary
for approval, the pivotal statutory criteria become "the character
of the management" and "all factors" in connection with financial
condition. The regulations do not expand upon these rudi-
mentary criteria, but do contain a description of internal process-
ing200 and a procedure for public notice of applications and op-
portunity for oral argument. 20 1 As we have previously noted, the
FSLIC does not have any approval authority over the establish-
ment of branches by state-chartered members.
There are no reported cases challenging FSLIC decisions to
grant or deny insured status to an applying institution.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIvE DECISION PROCESS
Court cases and judicial opinions do not provide a compre-
hensive picture of agency decision making, since they are con-
cerned with but a small and probably atypical fraction of all appli-
cations. We turn, therefore, to an overall statistical summary of
the licensing decisions of the federal banking agencies, and then
to a more detailed examination based upon a sample of actual de-
cision files.
A. The Statistical Picture
The following tables show the licensing decisions of the four
agencies over the five year period from 1969 to 1973, inclusive.
These statistics must be interpreted with caution, however, for the
policies followed by an agency, to the extent they are known and
predictable, shape the applications it receives. A low percentage
of denials, for example, would not necessarily mean an agency
was following a course of automatic approval; it might mean only
that applicants had a clear understanding of when to expect dis-
approval, and in those situations did not waste time applying.
Nonetheless, there are some striking patterns revealed by the
figures, and they correspond to the distinction between primary
and secondary supervision already noted.
199. 12 U.S.C. § 1726(c) (1970).
200. 12 C.F.R. § 571.6 (1974).
201. Id. §§ 562.4, 562.5.
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Table 3
Comptroller of the Currency Decisions
1969-1973
Total No.
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 (Percent)
1. Charter
applications 224 172 128 110 77 711 (100)
a. Approved 149 99 65 52 46 411 (58)
1) New 134 84 55 42 33 351 (49)
2) Conversion 15 15 10 10 13 63 (9)
b. Denied 70 63 57 48 25 263 (37)
1) New 69 60 54 46 24 253 (35)
2) Conversion 1 3 3 2 1 10(2)
c. Withdrawn or
abandoned 5 10 6 10 6 37(5)
1) New 4 10 5 9 2 30(4)
2) Conversion 1 0 1 1 4 7 (1)
2. Branch
applications* 1257 1070 917 987 1125 5356 (100)
a. Approved 1092 925 786 782 831 4416 (82)
b. Denied 119 116 104 152 200 691 (13)
c. Withdrawn or
abandoned 46 29 27 53 94 249 (5)
* Excluding mergers.
Source: COMP. CURR. ANN. REPS. 1968-1973, Tables 4, 6, 8.
The Comptroller, with respect to applications for national bank
charters and domestic branches, and the FHLBB, with respect to
applications for federal savings and loan association charters and
branches, act as primary supervisors, making the initial (and in-
deed the only) decision as to approval or rejection. Tables 3 and
4 present the data on their decisions. The rejection rates are high
enough to be quite meaningful; over this most recent five year
period, the Comptroller denied 13 percent of all branch appli-
cations and the Bank Board denied 18 percent. Putting aside
conversions of existing state institutions to federally chartered in-
stitutions, the Comptroller denied 40 percent (253 out of 634) of
the applications for new national banks and the FHLBB denied
61 percent (79 out of 129) of the applications for new federal
savings and loans.
By way of contrast, the FRB, FDIC and FSLIC are in the posi-
tion of secondary supervisors when they deal with institutions al-
ready chartered and regulated by state authorities. In performing
their statutory approval function over branches for state banks,
therefore, the FRB and FDIC are passing on issues previously
dealt with by state banking departments. Although the question
1975] Licensing Decisions of Federal Banking Agencies
Table 4
FHLBB Decisions
1969-1973
Total No.
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 (Percent)
1. Charter
applications 46 31 37 31 56 201 (100)
a. Approved 24 23 26 23 24 120 (60)
1) New 15 17 14 1 3 50(25)
2) Conversion 9 6 12 22 21 70 (35)
b. Denied 22 8 10 8 32 80(40)
1) New 22 8 9 8 32 79(39)
2) Conversion 0 0 1 0 0 1 *
c. Withdrawn 0 0 1 0 0 1 *
1) New 0 0 0 0 0 0
2) Conversion 0 0 1 0 0 1 *
2. Branch 1143
applications** (465) 654 487 249 255 2788 (100)
1002
a. Approved (391) 534 377 208 154 2275 (82)
140
b. Denied (74) 119 102 41 101 503 (18)
1
c. Withdrawn (0 1 8 0 0 10 *
* Less than V2%
•* Excluding mergers. (For 1973, limited service facilities are in parentheses.)
Source: FHLBB data.
of admission of a new applicant to system membership and deposit
insurance is more of an initial decision, the factors that the FRB,
FDIC and FSLIC consider under the relevant statutes are quite
similar to those that state authorities were supposed to consider in
their chartering decision, which precedes the membership applica-
tion. The outcome is reflected in Tables 5, 6, and 7. The approval
rate on branch applications was 99 percent for the FDIC and al-
most 100 percent for the FRB. On membership applications, the
approval rate was 98 percent for both the FRB and the FDIC;
only the FSLIC had a significant rejection rate of 30 percent.
With this latter exception, it is apparent that the main area in
which discretion is exercised, at least in a manner that applicants
do not fully comprehend and anticipate, is in the decisions of
those agencies that act as primary supervisors: the Comptroller
of the Currency and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
B. A Closer Look-The Comptroller
In order to understand better the agency decision-making pro-
cess, a study was made of a number of Comptroller's office de-
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Table 5
FRB Decisions
1969-1973
Total No.
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 (Percent)
1. Membership
applications 30 19 14 8 10 81(100)
a. Approved 29 19 13 8 10 79 (98)
1) Operating 3 6 4 0 3 16(20)
2) New 26 13 9 8 7 63(78)
b. Denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
1) Operating 0 0 0 0 0 0
2) New 0 0 0 0 0 0
c. Withdrawn 1 0 1 0 0 2(2)
1) Operating 0 0 0 0 0 0
2) New 1 0 1 0 0 2(2)
2. Domestic branch
applications* 250 262 212 211 194 1129
a. Approved 250 262 212 210 193 1127
b. Denied 0 0 0 1 1 2
c. Withdrawn 0 0 0 0 0 0
* Excluding mergers. The FRB also during this period approved 416 applications for
r foreign branches of national and state member banks; one was denied and one with-
drawn.
Source: FRB data.
Table 6
FDIC Decisions
1969-1973
Total No.
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 (Percent)
1. Insurance
applications 266 188 167 149 161 931 (100)
a. Approved 261 185 163 147 157 913 (98)
1) Operating 6 6 4 8 17 41(4)
2) Proposed 255 179 159 139 140 872 (94)
b. Denied 5 3 4 2 4 18(2)
1) Operating 0 0 0 0 0 0
2) Propsed 5 3 4 2 4 18(2)
c. Withdrawn 0 0 0 0 0 0
2. Branch
applications* 968 862 787 530 563 3710 (100)
961 848
a. Approved (165) (132) 773 527 556 3665 (99)
b. Denied 7 14 14 3 7 45(1)
c. Withdrawn 0 0 0 0 0 0
* Excluding mergers. (For 1972-73, limited service facilities are in parentheses.)
Source: FDIC data.
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Table 7
FSLIC Decisions
1969-1973
Total No.
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 (Percent)
Insurance
applications 49 20 19 19 18 125 (100)
a. Approved 39 12 11 11 11 84(67)
b. Denied 9 8 7 8 5 37(30)
c. Withdrawn 1 0 1 0 2 4(3)
Source: FSLIC data. No breakdown between operating associations and proposed
new associations was available.
cision files. That agency was chosen since it has figured in most of
the significant judicial review litigation of the last decade and is the
most important of the primary approval agencies in terms of the
size of the industry segment it regulates. °2 A random sample was
taken from charter decisions, branch approvals and branch denials
over the 1969-1973 period; with the usual vicissitudes of files that
were checked out or missing, the study group consisted of twenty-
seven charter files (fifteen approved and twelve rejected), twenty-
nine branch approvals, and thirty branch denials. These are fair-
ly small samples, and the analysis based on them is intended to be
suggestive, not conclusive. Nevertheless, it seemed desirable to
look at the decision process from the inside, since no similar study
had ever been undertaken.
1. Charter Decisions. The process formally begins when an "Ap-
plication to Organize a National Bank"20 3 is filed with the Region-
al Comptroller. This is a short form containing little more than
the proposed name, locations, and initial capital of the new bank,
together with rather long and detailed biographical and financial
statements by each of the organizers.2 0 4 The applicant is separately
required to submit additional information, primarily on the issue
of profitability: the location chosen, the population and economic
character of the area the bank will serve, competing financial in-
stitutions in that area, and projections of deposit and loan growth
and of income and expenses.2 0 5 This information is frequently
202. See Tables 1 & 2 supra.
203. Form CC 7022-16.
204. Form CC 6021-05 and 7021-04. The Comptroller customarily also requires these
forms from each director, officer and substantial stockholder (holding five percent or more
of the stock) of the new bank.
205. See Form CC 7022-18, set forth in the Appendix, pp. 297-98 infia.
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provided in the form of a "market survey" prepared by a consult-
ing firm.
The application is then assigned to a national bank examiner for
a field investigation. His comments and findings are rendered 20 6 in
two parts, the "Examiner's Report of an Investigation," which is
available to the public, and the "Confidential Memorandum" to
the Comptroller, which is not. The Examiner's Report sum-
marizes some of the application information and gives a brief
economic description of the service area and community, but con-
tains little in the way of evaluation. That is provided in the Con-
fidential Memorandum, on a number of topics. The examiner
gives his views on how much initial capital the bank should have;
he checks on the biographical and financial data furnished by the
principal figures in the proposed bank and offers his conclusions
about whether they are acceptable persons; and he answers ques-
tions such as these:
4. Is there a public need for the proposed bank or is
the area reasonably well served by existing banks and
branches?...
5. Is it reasonable to expect that the available banking busi-
ness will be adequate to support the proposed bank, if estab-
lished, together with existing competitive banks and branches,
or will an overbanked situation be created? Indicate whether a
healthy or unhealthy degree of competition will accrue.
He concludes by recommending either approval or denial of the
application. Neither the form nor any standard instructions pro-
vide criteria by which these judgments and conclusions are to be
reached; consequently, they rest largely on the personal attitudes
of the examiner to whom the application was assigned.
The applicant has to publish notice of the filing of the charter
application, and it is permissible, though uncommon, for objectors
to request a hearing.207 Otherwise, the application simply pro-
ceeds along a recommendation chain. The Regional Comptroller
adds his comments and recommendation to those of the local ex-
aminer, and then the application goes to Washington, where
three more recommendations are added-in turn, those of the
Director of the Bank Organization Division, an Economist, and a
Deputy Comptroller. These latter three recommendations are
206. See Form CC-1956-OX.
207. 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.2, 5.4 (1974).
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usually explained in a few sentences; the basis given for the other
two recommendations is summarized in a paragraph or two. When
the form arrives at the Comptroller's desk for final decision, he has
five recommendations set forth on two pages. The Comptroller
signifies his decision by signing on the approval or rejection line,
without any statement of reasons.
Although this decision procedure defies close analysis, as a num-
ber of courts have found out, it is possible to make some simple
breakdowns, based on the sample of twenty-seven charter files.
Table 8 shows the frequency with which the Comptroller agreed
Table 8
Staff Recommendations and Comptroller's Charter Decisions
(1969-1973 Sample)
Comptroller's Percentage of
Decision Approved (15) Disagreement Rejected (12)
Recommendations of Approval Rejection Approval Rejection
1. Examiner 10 5 44% 7 5
2. Regional Comptroller 9 6 30 2 10
3. Director, B.O.D. 10 5 33 4 8
4. Economist 11 4 27 3 8
5. Deputy Comptroller 13 2 11 1 11
Source: Comptroller's charter files.
with the recommendations of his various subordinates. The
Comptroller disagreed with his field examiner's view in almost
half the cases, and with his more senior staff in about a quarter
of the cases, on the average. The disagreements were mostly over
implicit standards and values, for the examiner was the only one
to undertake a significant factual investigation and there were
few disputes along the recommendation chain over what could be
called a matter of historical fact.
Table 9 provides a picture of the extent to which these disagree-
ments were clustered. It indicates the number of staff recom-
mendations contrary to the Comptroller's decision in each case.
In forty-one percent of the cases, the Comptroller and his staff
were in complete agreement, but twenty-six percent of the time
the Comptroller's decision was the opposite of the recommenda-
tion of a majority of his staff.
It is more difficult to get at the basis of these disagreements,
since the Comptroller makes no statement of his reasons and the
statements of the last three staff members in the recommendation
chain are usually very brief and conclusory. In each case, however,
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Table 9
Comptroller's Charter Decisions and Contrary Recommendations
(1969-1973 Sample)
No. of Contrary Staff Comptroller Comptroller Combined
Recommendations Approvals Rejections No. (Percentage)
0 7 4 11 41
1 3 2 5 19
2 1 3 4 15
3 0 3 3 11
4 3 0 3 11
5 1 0 1 4
TOTAL 15 -12 27 100
Source: Comptroller's charter files.
a list was made of the factors cited by each staff member in support
of his conclusion, and the factors were grouped into four broad
categories: (1) factors related to predicting the bank's profitability,
such as past or projected future economic growth of the commu-
nity, the business available to a new bank, the accessibility of its
location, and projections of loan and deposit growth and of in-
come and expense; (2) characteristics of the application and appli-
cant group, such as the reputation, financial strength and experi-
ence of the organizers, the distribution of stock ownership and its
"local" character, and the adequacy of the proposed initial capitali-
zation; (3) competitive aspects, such as the need for additional
competition in the locale, the prospect for injury to other banks,
and the operation of state laws limiting entry to certain markets;
and (4) factors seen as bearing on the convenience and needs of
the community, such as the absence or paucity of existing banking
offices in the locale, or the existence of adequate service at the
present time.
Attention was then focused on the thirteen cases in which the
Deputy Comptroller agreed with the Comptroller and disagreed
with one or more of his colleagues. In these cases disputes cen-
tered overwhelmingly on the matter of the "need" for a new bank.
In twelve of the thirteen cases, the opponents of charter issuance
viewed the locale as already adequately served and saw no indica-
tions of public need for a new bank. Those supporting charter is-
suance, on the other hand, most often cited rapid past or future
growth of the area (nine cases), adequate capitalization of the
proposed bank (eight cases), need for a new bank or added com-
petition (eight cases), and the absence of any particular injury to
existing banks (eight cases). The use and implications of these fac-
tors will be further discussed below.
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2. Branch decisions. The procedure on branch applications is
generally similar to that for charters. The application form20 8 is
a single page, but here too there is a requirement to submit addi-
tional information on competing institutions in the area to be
served and the population and economic character of the locale. 20 9
A national bank examiner then makes his field investigation, which
is again written up 21 0 in two parts-a publicly available Report and
a Confidential Memorandum. The Report covers the same ground
as the application, summarizing it and adding to it in a few re-
spects. The Confidential Memorandum contains the examiner's
comments on whether the bank has any problems "which may be
considered as factors against branch expansion" and on whether
any protests from other banks have "merit"; he lists what he be-
lieves to be the favorable and unfavorable factors and gives his
opinion and recommendation. The Regional Administrator then
adds his comments and recommendation.
At the Washington office, the recommendation chain differs
slightly from the charter process. First comes the Director of the
Bank Organization Division, as before. Then views are added
either by one of the several Deputy Comptrollers with supervisory
responsibility for different regions, or by the Chief National Bank
Examiner. Next comes another Deputy Comptroller, and then the
application goes to the Comptroller for his final decision. The
recommendations of the Comptroller's subordinates are contained
on two pages of the form, and the Comptroller's own decision is
not accompanied by any indication of its basis.
Table 10 shows the frequency with which the Comptroller's
branch decisions were in agreement with various subordinates'
recommendations. As compared with Table 8 on charter decisions,
the greater degree of agreement is striking. The same tendency is
evident in Table 11; in no case was a majority of the staff recom-
mendations contrary to the Comptroller's branch decision, and in
seventy-eight percent of the cases there was unanimity.
The reasons for this greater consistency are not apparent.
Where conflict did occur, it usually (fourteen out of eighteen
times) took the form of a staff recommendation of approval for a
branch application that the Comptroller denied; indeed, there
was unanimity on only two-thirds of the denials, as compared to
208. Form CC 7024-01.
209. Form CC 7024-06, which in many respects is identical to the charter form in the
Appendix.
210. See Form CC-1930-OX.
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Table 10
Staff Recommendations and Comptroller's Branch Decisions
(1969-1973 Sample)
Comptroller's Percentage of
Decision Approved (29) Disagreement Denied (30)
Recommendations of* Approval Denial Approval Denial
1. Examiner 25 2 15% 6 22
2. Regional Administrator 28 1 5 2 28
3. Director, B.O.D. 28 1 5 2 28
4. Chief Nat. Bank Examiner 5 0 " f 2 3
or 5
Deputy Comptroller 23 0 1 22
5. Deputy Comptroller 28 0 2 1 28
* In some instances, a recommendation was omitted.
Source: Comptroller's branch files.
Table 11
Comptroller's Branch Decisions and Contrary Recommendations
(1969-1973 Sample)
No. of Contrary Staff Comptroller Comptroller Combined
Recommendations Approvals Denials No. (Percentage)
0 26 20 46 78
1 2 6 8 14
2 1 4 5 8
3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 29 30 59 100
Source: Comptroller's branch files.
ninety percent of the approvals. (Overall, it may be recalled, the
Comptroller approved eighty-two percent and denied thirteen
percent of all branch applications. 211)
When attention is centered on the cases involving disagreement,
as before, the key issue seems to be whether the branch would be
profitable. There was dispute over this in nine of the twelve cases;
proponents cited rapid growth in the area and argued that other
banks were doing well, while opponents contended that the area
was adequately served, that profitability of the new branch was
doubtful, and that the application was premature.
211. See Table 3, p. 274 supra.
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3. Decision grounds. What can be said about the Comptroller's
decision process and grounds for decision, as set forth in the ap-
plication files? First of all, it is worth noting what factors do not
seem significant in most cases. Consider the factors enumerated in
section 18i6 of title 12 of the United States Code, which consti-
tutes the statutory framework for the Comptroller's exercise of
chartering discretion: "[1] The financial history and condition of
the bank, [2] the adequacy of its capital structure, [3] its future
earnings prospects, [4] the general character of its management,
[5] the convenience and needs of the community to be served by
the bank, and [6] whether or not its corporate powers are consis-
tent with the purposes of [the statute]. ' 12
The first and second factors amount, in the case of a newly char-
tered bank, to its initial capitalization. In none of the sample cases
was inadequate capitalization mentioned as an adverse factor or
reason for denial, and for a rather simple reason: the applicants
will generally either conform their application to the amount of ini-
tial capital which the agency indicates it deems desirable, or aban-
don the application as not feasible under the circumstances. For an
operating bank seeking a branch, these factors have more content.
But if there is serious supervisory concern over its management
or capital adequacy or operating policies, a bank is made aware
that there is no point in its applying for a branch at any location. 213
In effect, in both cases this issue is disposed of at an early stage and
is not reflected in the final figures.
The fourth factor, the general character of management, was
mentioned in some cases, but in fact was rarely determinative. A
lot of the charter application routine bears on this factor-the
long biographical and financial questionnaires required of the
organizers and principal stockholders and proposed managing
officers, and the investigation reports made on them by the field
examiner. It is generally understood, however, that if the agency
objects to any of these persons, he will be replaced or dropped
from the applicant group, so this factor too does not often deter-
mine the final outcome.214
212. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1970). See also 12 C.F.R. § 4.2(b) (1974).
213. This is made quite explicit in the FHLBB's treatment of "supervisory clearance";
see 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(a)(7) (1974). The withholding of branches is also used as a form of
supervisory pressure on an institution to conform to what the agency regards as desiiable
operating policies and practices.
214. The Comptroller insists that this part of the memorandum section of the ex-
aminer's report be kept confidential, to protect the anonymity of sources. The Comptroller's
policy carries with it the distinct possibility of personal unfairness, since disqualification may
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The sixth factor, corporate powers consistent with the purposes
of the act, to the extent it has any meaning at all, is satisfied by
the use of a prescribed form of articles of incorporation. It was
never referred to in any way in any sample case.
That leaves factors three and five, future earnings prospects
and the convenience and needs of the community; as already
noted, these were the central points of disagreement in the recom-
mendation chain. For branches, the debate was usually over
whether the branch would be profitable, while for charters the is-
sue was more often cast in terms of whether there was a "need"
for a new bank. Analytical distinctions between the two factors
were not clearly made, however. The discussion of community
need sometimes, though not often, involved an assertion that the
new entry would cause injury to existing banks or branches, but
that argument shaded into the argument that there was not enough
business for the new bank or branch to be profitable in the near
future.
Most of the Comptroller's decisions, therefore, seem to turn on
assessments of "need" and "profitability," and it is these two fac-
tors that warrant closer scrutiny. As it stands, each participant in
the recommendation chain forms his own judgment as to profit-
ability and reflects his own concept of need; there is no discussion
of, or explicit agreement on, the underlying premises. Unless that
consideration is systematically undertaken and articulated, the
Comptroller's decision process will never be comprehensible,
either internally or externally.
To afford an illustration of what would be entailed, let us ex-
plore these concepts somewhat further, from a critic's standpoint.
What does it mean to inquire whether the community "needs" a
new bank or branch? How is the public need for any new facility
or service determined, whether it be a bank or a department store
or supermarket? The answer for most products and services is
whether the public is willing to patronize it enough and pay
enough for it to be supplied at a profit-in other words, profit-
ability is a measure of the extent of "need." It ensures that the
social value of what is being provided, as measured by the public
itself and what it is willing to pay, exceeds the social costs of sup-
plying it. It is not apparent why this is not the standard of need to
apply to banking offices as well. In the Comptroller's files there
be founded on erroneous or distorted information that is not subject to correction or re-
buttal.
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are numerous examples of the use of much cruder standards-for
instance, whether there are other banking offices that customers
can go to without incurring what is, in the examiner's opinion, too
much inconvenience, or whether a casual interview process with
local businessmen turned up statements that they wanted a new
bank. It is not at all clear that the "need" criterion does not re-
solve itself into the other key issue of profitability.
But why should the Comptroller be concerned with profitability?
That factor is usually the worry of those who are financing a new
venture; they have the most at stake and every reason to go into
the matter as carefully as they can. It is hard to see why either
superior sources of information or superior thoroughness of
analysis would characterize the Comptroller's office as it grinds
through hundreds of applications each year. It is as if a Washing-
ton agency had to approve each decision of a grocery chain con-
cerning location of new outlets. A presumed agency expertise must
find some rational foundation in its actual capacities, or it is an
empty shibboleth.
But suppose we put aside the question of whether the agency or
the applicant is in the better position to make judgments about the
profitability of a particular location, and assume that applicants
will make more mistakes than the agency will-how is the public
interest thereby threatened? A bank simply closes down a branch
that does not become profitable; rather than attempting to second-
guess the bank's profitability estimate, the Comptroller could
merely ascertain whether the bank could afford the cost of an er-
ror. Similarly, in the case of a new charter, the Comptroller could
merely require that the amount of initial capital be sufficient to
cover several years of operating losses.
A familiar rejoinder would be that we are concerned about the
effects of a mistaken judgment, not merely or even primarily on
the applicant, but on other institutions. In the jargon of the busi-
ness, the concern is that new entry would lead to an "overbanked"
condition. In more general terminology, the argument is that er-
rors of entry judgment (which by assumption are made more often
by applicants than by the agency) will at times produce excess
capacity. Although long run excess capacity in an industry is nor-
mally corrected by elimination of the industry's less efficient fa-
cilities or firms, the argument continues, banking is a special case
because the contraction may involve bank failure. At this point the
argument tends to become either emotional or obscure. To some,
the very words conjure up the collapse of the 1930s and the
thought is unacceptable, though the fact is that several hundred
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banks have failed since the 1930s. 215 To others, apparently, a
policy of preventing bank failures is viewed as having major bene-
fits but no costs. 216
A less extreme position would be that, while entry controls and
a policy of failure prevention do have costs, they are outweighed
by the benefits. But that position too is open to criticism on both
theoretical and empirical grounds. For example, to what extent
do entry controls actually prevent bank failure? At best (or worst),
entry controls can confer a protected monopoly position on certain
firms; that may be reflected in the present market value of the
firm, but it does not constrain the future operations and policies
of risk-acceptance by the firm. Nor is it easy to see the large metro-
politan centers and national banking markets, in which the big
banks operate, as protected monopolies; there are too many sub-
stantial competing firms. To the extent entry controls have suc-
cessfully created monopoly positions (or "prevented overbanking,"
in the preferred phrase), it is probably in local markets and small-
er towns. Is the purpose of entry controls mainly to prevent the
failure of small banks? Why, and for whose benefit? Presumably,
it is not to protect the stockholders; that is the very risk they under-
take to bear. Perhaps to protect the depositors? But most of them
are covered by deposit insurance; the smaller the bank, the higher
tends to be the percentage of its deposits that are insured. 21 7 De-
posit insurance merely transfers the loss to the FDIC, so perhaps
the need is to protect the insurance fund? But the failure of small
banks is the kind of event that the FDIC and FSLIC insurance
funds can most easily handle, and there is little reason to doubt
their adequacy for this purpose. 21 8
215. See 1973 FDIC ANN. REP. 227 (Table 121).
216. For a quite contrary view, see Tussing, The Case for Bank Failure, 10 J. LAW & ECON.
129 (1967). Some of the costs to bank customers are reflected in the monopoly franchise
value that attaches to new charters upon approval, a phenomenon that troubles the bank-
ing agencies. Their response has been to block immediate resales of controlling stock, to
limit attorneys' fees charged successful applicants, and in general to try to suppress the
visible signs of the franchise value. See, e.g., FHLBB, OUTLINE OF INFORMATION Ex. G No.
20 (1967, rev. 1969); FDIC, Statement of Policy on Legal Fees, 37 Fed. Reg. 17778 (1972).
217. As of June 29, 1968, 75 percent of total deposits in banks with under $5 million in
deposits were in accounts below the insurance ceiling (which was then $15,000), while in
banks with over $100 million in deposits, the figure was 34 percent. See FDIC, SUMMARY OF
ACCOUNTS AND DEPOSITS IN ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS 5 (1969). The insurance ceiling has
now been increased to $40,000 by Pub. L. 93-495. And a family can have a number of in-
sured accounts in the same institution. See Scott, Some Answers to Account Insurance Problems,
23 Bus. LAW. 493 (1968).
218. There would be even less reason if the insurance corporations were not required
to charge all firms a single rate regardless of individual risk. For a more comprehensive dis-
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In short, the reasons for the Comptroller's concern with entry
controls, and with overriding applicants' estimates of need and
profitability, are by no means self-evident or self-validating. If it
is to protect banks and their stockholders from losing money on
poor site selections, it seems unwarranted. On this score, it also
seems unsound, for it is hard to give credence to the proposition
that on the whole the Comptroller's staff in Washington or in the
field can judge the business potential of different locations across
the entire United States better than the applicants can. If it is to
protect depositors, or really the deposit insurance funds, from
losses due to failures caused by "unhealthy" competition, it seems
unnecessary on the one hand and largely impossible on the other.
Among other things, there are too many sources of competitive
pressure quite outside the Comptroller's control-not only state
banks, and savings and loan associations, but also, increasingly in
recent years, other investment media (such as mutual funds and
direct investment in the capital markets) and other sources of
loans (such as insurance companies, or direct access to the capital
markets through commercial paper or variable-rate notes). It is
not surprising, therefore, to find that economists have become
dubious about the justification and effects of entry controls in
banking.219
The foregoing discussion is not intended to reach a conclusion
or be definitive, but merely to open up the kind of issues that the
Comptroller should be facing in his administration of entry con-
trols for national banks. What are the justifications and objec-
tives of entry controls that the Comptroller believes have current
validity? What determinations, concerning need or profitability
or unhealthy competition or whatever, is he thereby required to
make? On what sort of findings of fact are those determinations
to be based?
The answers to those questions will not be obtained by opening
up the "confidential" part of the Comptroller's files, as some of
the cases220 sought to do, for they cannot be found there either.
So far as an examination of over a hundred branch and charter
cussion, see Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal Deposit
Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1971).
219. See generally Alhadeff, A Reconsideration of Restrictions on Bank Entry, 76 Q.J. ECON.
246 (1962); Meltzer, Major Issues in the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 75 J. POL Eco.
482 (1967); Peltzman, Bank Entry Regulation: Its Impact and Purpose, 3 NAT. BANK. REV. 163
(1965).
220. See text and notes at notes 111-20 supra.
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files reveals, the problem is one of developing explicit answers
and standards; they simply do not now exist.
Although this discussion has centered on the Comptroller, its
applicability is not confined to him. In its essential characteristics,
the branch and charter decision process of the FHLBB has the
same shortcomings, though the Bank Board has much less often
been taken to court. The purpose has been not to single out the
Comptroller, but to use his procedures as a way of developing in
some depth the problems presented by all the federal banking
agencies in their licensing decisions.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The judicial cases recounted in the first part pf this paper dem-
onstrated the determined resistance of the Comptroller and other
agencies to providing applicants (and courts) with intelligible ex-
planations of licensing decisions. The study of application files
strongly suggests that at least one reason for that resistance is that
there is no systematic and intellectually respectable basis for
branch and charter decisions. Instead, there is a process of ad hoc
recommendations and conflicting pressures, leaving fertile soil
for a suspicion that the outcome can turn on political favoritism or
outright corruption."2 ' In essence, the banking agencies have
failed to develop and announce public policy on these questions,
although Congress, by enacting vague and general statutory stan-
dards, has in effect delegated to them a responsibility to do so. 222
This failure cannot be justified or excused on the basis of insuffi-
cient time for study or reflection or the accumulation of experi-
ence; the Comptroller's office has been in existence, and making
221. The latest examples, involving charges of favoritism for Nixon supporters, have
concerned the Comptroller's approval of a national bank charter for a group that included
Dwayne 0. Andreas, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1972, at 21, col. 6, and id., Sept. 29, 1972, at
30, col. 1; the Comptroller's denial of a charter for a bank that would have competed with
Charles Rebozo's Key Biscayne Bank & Trust Co., see id., Oct. 17, 1973, at 27, col. 2; and the
FHLBB's approval of account insurance for a new state savings and loan in Key Biscayne
formed by Rebozo associates, see id., Oct. 23, 1973, at 37, col. 4. See also 119 CONG. REC. H
9236-37 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1973); id. at E 6658-60 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1973); Hearings on
Financial Structure and Regulation Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Connittee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 378-80 (1973).
222. Cf. Morion v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-32 (1974): "The power of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires
the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly,
by Congress .... No matter how rational or consistent with congressional intent a particular
decision might be, the determination of eligibility cannot be made on an ad hoc basis by the
dispenser of the funds."
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such decisions, for over a century, and even the relative new-
comers have had four decades.
Why has this state of affairs been so long invulnerable to assault
in the courts? Much of the explanation probably lies in the tradi-
tional view that an applicant for a bank charter or branch has no
"right" to engage in the banking business at the desired location;
he is merely a petitioner for a "privilege" bestowed by the govern-
ment, a suppliant for an act of largesse. Thus, the argument runs,
he has no recognized "property" interest calling for due process
protection. This attitude is reflected in the almost unanimous
holding that the Comptroller and other agencies are not consti-
tutionally required to reach decisions by way of trial-type hear-
ings. 223
The right-privilege dichotomy, as a touchstone for due process
analysis, has undergone a decline in recent years. 224 Welfare
benefits were the classic case of governmental gratuities, to be dis-
pensed in whatever manner the legislature might choose, but the
Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly225 imposed the requirement of
a fair evidentiary hearing before they could be terminated.226 The
category of property interests protected by procedural due process
was enlarged to include government benefits to which a person
claims he is entitled. 227 A "legitimate claim of entitlement"228 may
be based upon a statute whereby the government awards valuable
benefits or privileges, just as much as upon contract or historically
familiar forms of private property.
Although these cases show which way the wind is blowing, it is
doubtful that the Comptroller's house has yet been toppled by
them. They involve the termination of a preexisting (and thus re-
lied upon) benefit or status, rather than an initial decision on an
application, and that consideration is usually viewed as strengthen-
ing the claim that due process necessitates an evidentiary hearing.229
223. See text and notes at notes 58-68, 141-44 supra.
224. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
225. 397 U.S. 254. (1970).
226. The pre-termination fair hearing requirement was subsequently extended to driv-
er's license suspensions, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), to parole revocations, Morris-
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and to probation revocations, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973), but not to discharge from government employment, Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974).
227. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972).
228. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
229. See, e.g., Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 744 (1964). The distinction has
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Furthermore, they involve situations where either the statute or
the agency has spelled out eligibility requirements for the benefit
with some precision or the plaintiff is already its possessor, so the
claim of "entitlement" is not difficult for a court to pass upon. By
contrast, where both statute and agency have left the bases for con-
ferring the benefit utterly vague, the threshold showing of entitle-
ment would seem impossible to make.230 Ironically, therefore, the
poorer the job an agency does in developing policy standards, the
more minimal will be the procedural requirements it must satisfy.
But even more basic is the fact that the recent due process cases
have been concerned with the need for a full evidentiary hearing.
Although that is admittedly lacking in the banking decision pro-
cess, it is not as yet the factor whose absence seems critical and
whose presence is much to be desired. Judicialization of agency
decision making is a remedy often prescribed, but its costs in terms
of delay and expense frequently exceed by a wide margin its con-
tribution towards improving the quality of decisions. 231
At this stage, at any rate, the pressing need is for the articulation
of policy rather than for trial-type hearings. The immediate prob-
lem is not one of resolving disputes about historical facts, but of
specifying the purpose and bases of the exercise of controls over
entry into banking markets. In terms of legal form, that can be
achieved in one of two ways: by the adoption of policy statements
and the exercise of the rulemaking power, or by a process of case-
by-case adjudication and reasoned opinions. The route of policy
not appealed to all courts. Compare Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Auth., 29 N.Y.2d 420,
328 N.Y.S.2d 649, 278 N.E.2d 892 (1972), with Davis v. Toledo Metro. Housing Auth., 311
F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
230. To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
231. Possibly the small group of cases where an applicant or organizer is rejected or ex-
cluded on personal grounds constitutes an exception. The present procedure of disqualifica-
tion on the basis of secret evidence might not withstand legal challenge; it can be argued that
the person being branded as unacceptable is both stigmatized (at least within the agency
and among the applicant group, and, given interchange of information among the bank-
ing agencies, on occasion with other agencies as well) and to some extent denied the liberty
to enter a recognized occupation. At the same time, the reasons for secrecy do not involve
lofty goals like protecting national security; in most of the sample cases, the adverse reports
concerned a poor credit rating or financial position, and the source was treated as confi-
dential simply to avoid embarrassment. Under these circumstances, due process probably
entitles the barred applicant to an evidentiary hearing. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96
(1963); Norlander v. Schleck, 345 F. Supp. 595 (D. Minn. 1972). Of course, as long as the
final decision remains so totally discretionary, most such persons will be dissuaded by their
colleagues from pursuing the matter and alienating the agency.
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statements and rulemaking seems preferable, because it tends to
force the decision maker to confront the more fundamental ques-
tions and think through and justify comprehensive answers; 232
that may explain its relative neglect. Alternatively, at least in theory,
an agency can develop a consistent policy in piecemeal fashion, by
separate adjudications-but the world will never know it unless
opinions are written and published.
There is little that courts can do to force an agency to use its
rulemaking authority,233 but they are in a better position to require
written explanations of decisions that are subject to judicial review,
even in areas in which neither due process nor the Administrative
Procedure Act 234 requires trial-type hearings. The very concept
of limited review requires that the decision maker provide a rea-
soned justification for his action. As the Supreme Court said in
Chenety H:
If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon
which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with
such clarity as to be understandable. It will not do for a court
to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agen-
cy's action .... In other words, 'We must know what a deci-
sion means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is
right or wrong.' 235
With a general decline in the level of automatic judicial deference
to agency expertise has come a corresponding recent increase in
the demand that agencies give reasoned explanations for their de-
cisions, even when that is not required by the statute under which
they are acting.236 Most of these cases involve statutory review
(where the statute under which the agency is acting has an explicit
provision for court review) and that means that Congress intended
for the agency to have to explain and defend its decisions in court.
232. Cf. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Ad-
judication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 526 (1970); Shapiro,
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 921, 937-40 (1965).
233. Compare NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764-65 (1969), with NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974).
234. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-57 (1970).
235. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947). See also Burlington Truck
Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-69 (1962); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S
177, 197 (1941).
236. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973);
Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. CAB, 475 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439
F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
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In cases of nonstatutory review (where the statute lacks an express
judicial review provision and the plaintiff relies on the general
jurisdiction of the federal courts in seeking an injunction or declar-
atory judgment), the courts have been more hesitant to intrude upon
agency discretion, even by merely asking for explanation in any
but a pro forma sense. But the same tendency is visible here, 237
and for the same reasons. Without explanation by the agency, as
the banking cases previously discussed make clear, the court in af-
fording judicial review is reduced to an unhappy choice between
usurpation and futility.
There is no longer much room for dispute that charter and
branch decisions are subject to judicial review, at the behest of
either applicants or competitors. 23 8 Though an applicant may have
no right to a charter or a branch, he has a right to have his applica-
tion decided according to law by the agency, and the right to ju-
dicial review of that decision carries with it the necessity for ex-
planation of its grounds.
The real issue is how little explanation will suffice. As satisfac-
tion with the performance of administrative agencies has lessened,
the level of understanding being required has risen, and remands
for a more intelligible explanation have become a commonplace.239
In nonstatutory review (which includes the bank licensing cases),
however, the courts have been less assertive, or at least less explicit.
Overton Park240 demanded simply "an adequate explanation" by the
Secretary of Transportation for his action, leaving it largely to the
district court to decide whether the administrative record already
provided one or had to be supplemented through formal, if be-
lated, findings or actual testimony and cross examination. Pitts24 1
did not change this position, though it did intimate that a "curt"
explanation might be good enough. 242
237. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Citizens
Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402, 408-10 (D.C. Cir. 1973); District of Col. Fed'n of
Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
238. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
239. See, e.g., Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-09
(1973); NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1321-26 (D.C. Cir. 1972); USV
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Secretary of HEW, 466 F.2d 455, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971).
240. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
241. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
242. The authority of that intimation is undermined by the fact that the case was de-
cided on the certiorari papers without either full briefing or oral argument. The Court was
in all likelihood unacquainted with the history of difficulties that had been encountered
in reviewing the Comptroller's customarily "curt" explanations of decisions.
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But however full or inadequate the explanation that the courts
are prepared to demand, the requirements of good administra-
tion are an independent matter. Banking plays too central a role
in our economic system, and the issues at stake in the administra-
tion of entry controls are too important, for a continuation of the
present regime of unexamined and unexplained exercises of dis-
cretion. Whether they are ultimately forced to it by the courts or
not, the banking agencies should articulate their policies and their
reasons24 3 -and not in the curt and superficial manner of Pitts.
The usual response to such a recommendation is that writing
opinions in all cases would be a substantial burden on overworked
staffs, and generally of little value since decisions depend on par-
ticular fact settings. There are answers on a number of levels. First
and most fundamental, opinion writing is not the only or even the
preferable way of establishing a clear policy; the route of policy
statements and rulemaking, in terms of objective standards, would
be more comprehensive and satisfactory.244 It also makes more evi-
dent the gaps and inconsistencies in underlying premises and is
therefore less likely to be adopted. On the charitable assumption
that still more time and experience is necessary to work the prob-
lems through, perhaps a practice of case-by-case adjudication can
still be rationalized. Second, the overworked staff objection is gen-
erally available against doing anything not already being done, but
it has less application to the banking agencies than to most others.
These agencies do not depend on Congressional appropriations for
their funds, nor (with the exception of the FHLBB) on Congres-
sional authorizations for their budgetary expenditures. If the job
is worth doing, the staff can be increased. Third, the point about
the limited value of most decisions does have merit. It has the most
merit when policies are inchoate and standards are undefined, so
that opinions consist of a list of the "relevant" factors in a particular
case and a conclusion, with the connecting links left to the reader's
imagination or the court's "opening-presumption of correctness."
Still, if that is all the decision process has to offer, written opinions
at least expose the vacuity to the view of courts and critics, instead
of hiding it behind a protective veil of obscurity and trust in ex-
pertise.
243. The suggestion is not exactly a new one. See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE AGENCIES (1962).
244. The validity of substantive informal rulemaking of this sort was recently consid-
ered at length and sustained, for the FTC, in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC,
482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). See also Verkuil,Judicial Re-
view ofInformal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974).
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Another line of objection to explanatory opinions is based on
the fact that applications are sometimes, though not often, rejected
on grounds that the agency believes would be substantially injuri-
ous to a bank or individual if made public. The existence of this
possibility in a few cases is not an excuse for a general policy of
non-explanation, and it ought not to be automatically invoked to
shield all negative information. However, instances may remain
where the agency believes it should not disclose certain informa-
tion, in order to preserve (unwarranted) public confidence. If the
information pertains to the applicant bank or group, the applicant
could be afforded the option of withdrawing its request; if it per-
tains to an objecting bank, the ground could be expressly stated
but in general terms, such as "to prevent an adverse impact on
other institutions."2 45
It is submitted, therefore, that opinions in at least part of the
cases should be regularly forthcoming. The following recommen-
dations are designed to meet the need for a fuller explanation of
the licensing decisions of the federal banking agencies, while tak-
ing into account distinctions between the various types of decisions
and attempting to minimize the call on agency resources.
Recommendation 1. General. The federal banking agencies
should undertake to provide a full statement of their objectives
in approving or denying charter or membership applications and
branches, and should define in concrete terms the standards to be
applied. This can be done best by the adoption of policy state-
ments and rules of general applicability, which should be as spe-
cific as possible. To provide additional clarity and understanding,
reasoned opinions should be issued in certain situations as set forth
below.
It should be noted that as policy statements and definitions of
standards become more specific, it becomes less burdensome to
decide and explain individual cases.
Recommendation 2. Primary supervisor decisions: Comptroller and
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. In the case of branch applica-
tions, the numbers are large and many approvals seem a matter of
routine. Probably only a small minority of approvals, but a much
larger fraction of denials, would occasion a desire or need for ex-
planation. For branches, therefore, the Comptroller and the
245. If judicial review is sought, the court can, to the extent deemed warranted, afford
in camera or protective order treatment to the supporting evidence.
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FHLBB should furnish written opinions only when so requested
by the applicant or by objectors, or when the agency believes the
case presents issues of general importance. It would be appropri-
ate to charge the requesting party an amount commensurate with
the time cost of opinion preparation.246
Charter decisions are considerably fewer in number and, at
present, more obscure in their grounds--in the Comptroller's case,
even to his own staff, let alone applicants or protestants. An
opinion should be furnished as a matter of course in all charter
denials, since this is the most critical entry barrier, and in approvals
when requested.
Recommendation 3. Secondary supervisor decisions: Federal Reserve
Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation. Branch approvals by the FRB and
FDIC seem well-nigh automatic, no doubt because of reliance on
the primary approval of other authorities, and an opinion re-
quirement in all cases would seem excessive. Rejections are some-
thing of an extraordinary event, however, and should always be
accompanied by a full explanatory opinion.
Membership applications may not wholly fall into the same cate-
gory, though only the FSLIC has a significant rejection ratio. It
would probably be worthwhile to furnish written opinions on re-
quest, which would presumably be forthcoming mainly in the
event of denial.
Recommendation 4. Publication. All four agencies should sys-
tematically collect and publish their licensing decisions and
opinions in some convenient form. Depending on frequency and
length, those of general importance might be included as part of
monthly publications such as the Federal Reserve Bulletin or Federal
Home Loan Bank Board Journal, or as an appendix to annual re-
ports; others might be published as a separate series and made
available in public files at the agency's Washington and field of-
fices. 24
7
As a concluding caveat, it must be recognized that opinions may
be a necessary ingredient in the development and application of
a coherent and well-defined policy of administration of entry con-
246. See 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States,
415 U.S. 336 (1974).
247. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.
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trols, but they do not ensure such a policy. The opinions will be
largely worthless if they consist of no more than a list of factors or
a recital of facts, followed by a leap to the conclusion boilerplate
without articulation of the connecting theories and standards and
tradeoffs. 2 48 The decade of judicial decisions previously reviewed
shows a growing disinclination on the part of courts to approve
what they cannot follow, so long as they can view it as well in-
tended and not corrupt. That tendency toward greater judicial
rigor is to be applauded, but it is even more important that the
agencies themselves move at last to discharge the policy making
responsibilities inherent in the broad discretion conferred upon
them by the Congress.
248. Judge Jerome Frank paid his respects to such "woosh-woosh" opinions in Old
Colony Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 161 F.2d 413, 449-52 (2d Cir. 1947)
(dissenting opinion).
197!
and instalment three years
loans
Hours of business Estimate of corn- Lon-deposit
mercial bank share ratio
of mortgage loan
business
(4) Provide handy-sized duplicate maps (with a scale of miles and compass
points) of the city or area appropriately labeled to show the location
of the proposed bank and the names and locations of all banks and branches,
including applications pending and those approved but not opened. Aerial
photographs of reasonable coverage, including expected service area are
helpful, and if available, one so labeled should be submitted. The expected
service area of the proposed bank should be clearly outlined on the maps
and on aerial photographs.
(5) Provide the following information with respect to Savings and Loan, Building
and loan, ard Mutual Savings Banks located within the proposed service area.
Names and Date established Share Loans Distance by road
Addresses if within three Accounts mileage and
years direction from
proposed bank
(6) Indicate the number of the following institutions within the proposed service
area three years ago and the number of each at the present: Credit Unions,
Finance companies, Insurance companies granting loans, and other institutions
granting loans.
*Include applications pending and those approved but not opened.
Form CC 7022-18
Rev 3/71
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APPENDIX
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE
FILING OF AN-APPLICATION TO ORGANIZE A NATIONAL BANK
(1) Population of city, town, county, village or municipality in which the
proposed bank is to be located as of the last decennial census and a
present estimate.
(2) (a) Estimated population of the service area, for last decennial census
and a present estimate from which the proposed bank is expected to
generate 75% or more of its loans and deposits.
(b) This area extends from the proposed bank location approximately
miles north; miles east; _ miles south;
miles west.
(Area must be outlined on the maps and aerial photographs submitted)
(3) Provide the following information with respect to each competitive bank
and branches thereof located within the service area of the proposed bank
(if complete branch figures are not available use consolidated figures).
In nonpr, so indicate.
Location marker Date established Deposits Loans
number, names if within three
and addresses years
Distance by road Interest rates paid Interest rates Rate of
mileage and direction on savings deposits normally re- return on
from proposed bank and certificates of ceived on short- capital fc
deposits term business previous
Or
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(7) Indicate degree of intensity of competition in service area by Savings and
Loan, Mutual Savings Banks, Credit Banks, etc.
(8) Provide a copy of any survey made preliminary to filing the application for
the proposed bank and also the cost for any such survey.
(9) Comment on the economic character of the area to be served.
A. If area is largely residential, state whether homes are generally owner-
occupied, the extent of housing development, type, quality, price level,
average age, number of unsold new homes, and prospect for continued
development.
B. If primarily industrial or business, state the number and general types
of business, and in the cases of principal employers, give the name of
each company or firm, number of employees, and payroll, and comment on
the consistency of employment and special skills required.
C. Shopping center locations should be fully described. State the number
of units, size as to total land and building area, number of individual
parking spaces, accessibility to surrounding communities, the extent to
which signed leases have been obtained, the names of principal lessees,
and provide information as to their financial responsibility, if not
national concerns.
D. Provide information regarding population growth potential; new businesses
recently established or planned, etc. Discuss the traffic pattern, the
street and road facilities, and their adequacy. Describe geographical
barriers, if any.
(10) If no bank in community, where is banking business conducted by residents?
(11) Past banking history of community.
(12) Proposed ownership of stock, is it to be widely distributed or closely
held. Amounts to be taken by organizers, proposed directors, officers
and their families.
(13) Financ3nl position of city, town, village, school districts and county.
Di.scuss tax collections, showing total levy, percentage collected and
arreari., etc.
(14) List the major types of loaning demands proposed bank expects to serve.
(15) Give estimates of the volume of total deposits, showing the amount of
public funds included in total and total loans expected at the end of
the first year of operations, second and third year.
(16) A detailed projection of earnings and expenses must be submitted showing
the breakdown of income and expenses for each of the first three years of
operations.
(17) Give the following information regarding banking house and equipment as
it applies:
(a) If to be purchased, the separate costs of land, building, furniture
and fixtures, and vault.
(b) If to be leased, give terms in brief and describe the quarters.
(c) If property is to be purchased or leased from a director, officer,
or large shareholder, state name and other pertinent data.
(d) Give expiration date of any option to purchase or lease.
(e) If new construction, furnish anticipated completion date.
(f) If a temporary location is planned, furnish exact address, distance
and direction from permanent location, and period it will be occupied.
(g) State the approximate period of time that will be required to place
bank in operation in temporary and/or permanent site.
(18) What plans have been made to obtain fidelity insurance covering all
individuals authorized to collect, receive or deposit funds from stock
subscriptions?
